# There must be encapsulated nonconceptual content in vision

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.15538 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.15538/

## Key facts

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- First posted on arXiv 6 Mar 2025.

## Abstract (arXiv)

In this paper I want to propose an argument to support Jerry Fodor's thesis (Fodor 1983) that input systems are modular and thus informationally encapsulated. The argument starts with the suggestion that there is a "grounding problem" in perception, i. e. that there is a problem in explaining how perception that can yield a visual experience is possible, how sensation can become meaningful perception of something for the subject. Given that visual experience is actually possible, this invites a transcendental argument that explains the conditions of its possibility. I propose that one of these conditions is the existence of a visual module in Fodor's sense that allows the step from sensation to object-identifying perception, thus enabling visual experience. It seems to follow that there is informationally encapsulated nonconceptual content in visual perception.