# Competing LLM Agents in a Non-Cooperative Game of Opinion Polarisation

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.11649 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.11649/

## Key facts

- Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Social simulation and multi-agent debate, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use.
- Builds on 6 of its 56 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 17 Feb 2025.

## Placed in

- LLM agents and tool use / [Social simulation and multi-agent debate](https://mlsanity.com/agents/social-simulation-and-multi-agent-debate/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 6 of 6)

- [GPT-4o System Card](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.21276/) (2024)
- [Gemini 1.5: Unlocking multimodal understanding across millions of tokens of context](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.05530/) (2024)
- [Gemma 2: Improving Open Language Models at a Practical Size](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2408.00118/) (2024)
- [Mixtral of Experts](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2401.04088/) (2024)
- [Simulating Opinion Dynamics with Networks of LLM-based Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.09618/) (2023)
- [Decoding Echo Chambers: LLM-Powered Simulations Revealing Polarization in Social Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2409.19338/) (2024)

## Built on by (most cited first, 2 of 2)

- [Towards Simulating Social Influence Dynamics with LLM-based Multi-agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.22467/) (2025)
- [Agent-based Modeling: Equilibrium, Echo Chambers, and Efficiency in Hybrid Coevolutionary Opinion Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.27639/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We introduce a novel non-cooperative game to analyse opinion formation and resistance, incorporating principles from social psychology such as confirmation bias, resource constraints, and influence penalties. Our simulation features Large Language Model (LLM) agents competing to influence a population, with penalties imposed for generating messages that propagate or counter misinformation. This framework integrates resource optimisation into the agents' decision-making process. Our findings demonstrate that while higher confirmation bias strengthens opinion alignment within groups, it also exacerbates overall polarisation. Conversely, lower confirmation bias leads to fragmented opinions and limited shifts in individual beliefs. Investing heavily in a high-resource debunking strategy can initially align the population with the debunking agent, but risks rapid resource depletion and diminished long-term influence