# ELITE: Enhanced Language-Image Toxicity Evaluation for Safety

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.04757 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.04757/

## Key facts

- Cited by 5 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in MLLM jailbreaks and adversarial robustness, one of 16 directions in Multimodal LLMs / vision-language models.
- Builds on 20 of its 27 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 7 Feb 2025.

## Placed in

- Multimodal LLMs / vision-language models / [MLLM jailbreaks and adversarial robustness](https://mlsanity.com/mllm/mllm-jailbreaks-and-adversarial-robustness/)
- LLM safety and security / [Vision-language and text-to-image safety](https://mlsanity.com/safety/vision-language-and-text-to-image-safety/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 20 of 20)

- [The Llama 3 Herd of Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.21783/) (2024)
- [Improved Baselines with Visual Instruction Tuning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.03744/) (2023)
- [Qwen2-VL: Enhancing Vision-Language Model's Perception of the World at Any Resolution](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2409.12191/) (2024)
- [Deep Learning Face Attributes in the Wild](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1411.7766/) (2014)
- [Gemini 1.5: Unlocking multimodal understanding across millions of tokens of context](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.05530/) (2024)
- [Phi-3 Technical Report: A Highly Capable Language Model Locally on Your Phone](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.14219/) (2024)
- [Expanding Performance Boundaries of Open-Source Multimodal Models with Model, Data, and Test-Time Scaling](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2412.05271/) (2024)
- [Llama Guard: LLM-based Input-Output Safeguard for Human-AI Conversations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.06674/) (2023)
- [ShareGPT4V: Improving Large Multi-Modal Models with Better Captions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.12793/) (2023)
- [DecodingTrust: A Comprehensive Assessment of Trustworthiness in GPT Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.11698/) (2023)
- [FigStep: Jailbreaking Large Vision-Language Models via Typographic Visual Prompts](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.05608/) (2023)
- [A StrongREJECT for Empty Jailbreaks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.10260/) (2024)
- [A Holistic Approach to Undesired Content Detection in the Real World](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2208.03274/) (2022)
- [Are aligned neural networks adversarially aligned?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.15447/) (2023)
- [Deliberative Alignment: Reasoning Enables Safer Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2412.16339/) (2024)
- [MM-SafetyBench: A Benchmark for Safety Evaluation of Multimodal Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.17600/) (2023)
- [JailBreakV: A Benchmark for Assessing the Robustness of MultiModal Large Language Models against Jailbreak Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.03027/) (2024)
- [Safety Fine-Tuning at (Almost) No Cost: A Baseline for Vision Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.02207/) (2024)
- [Red Teaming Visual Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2401.12915/) (2024)
- [MLLMGuard: A Multi-dimensional Safety Evaluation Suite for Multimodal Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.07594/) (2024)

## Built on by (most cited first, 5 of 5)

- [Jailbreaking on Text-to-Video Models via Scene Splitting Strategy](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.22292/) (2025)
- [VLSU: Mapping the Limits of Joint Multimodal Understanding for AI Safety](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.18214/) (2025)
- [Seeing the Threat: Vulnerabilities in Vision-Language Models to Adversarial Attack](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.21967/) (2025)
- [The Side Effects of Being Smart: Safety Risks in MLLMs' Multi-Image Reasoning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2601.14127/) (2026)
- [COMPASS: A Framework for Evaluating Organization-Specific Policy Alignment in LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2601.01836/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Current Vision Language Models (VLMs) remain vulnerable to malicious prompts that induce harmful outputs. Existing safety benchmarks for VLMs primarily rely on automated evaluation methods, but these methods struggle to detect implicit harmful content or produce inaccurate evaluations. Therefore, we found that existing benchmarks have low levels of harmfulness, ambiguous data, and limited diversity in image-text pair combinations. To address these issues, we propose the ELITE benchmark, a high-quality safety evaluation benchmark for VLMs, underpinned by our enhanced evaluation method, the ELITE evaluator. The ELITE evaluator explicitly incorporates a toxicity score to accurately assess harmfulness in multimodal contexts, where VLMs often provide specific, convincing, but unharmful descriptions of images. We filter out ambiguous and low-quality image-text pairs from existing benchmarks using the ELITE evaluator and generate diverse combinations of safe and unsafe image-text pairs. Our experiments demonstrate that the ELITE evaluator achieves superior alignment with human evaluations compared to prior automated methods, and the ELITE benchmark offers enhanced benchmark quality and diversity. By introducing ELITE, we pave the way for safer, more robust VLMs, contributing essential tools for evaluating and mitigating safety risks in real-world applications.