# Explanation Design in Strategic Learning: Sufficient Explanations that Induce Non-harmful Responses

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.04058 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.04058/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 37 of its 64 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 6 Feb 2025.

## Builds on (most cited first, 30 of 37)

- [A Unified Approach to Interpreting Model Predictions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1705.07874/) (2017)
- ["Why Should I Trust You?": Explaining the Predictions of Any Classifier](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1602.04938/) (2016)
- [Counterfactual Explanations without Opening the Black Box: Automated Decisions and the GDPR](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1711.00399/) (2017)
- [Modeling Tabular data using Conditional GAN](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1907.00503/) (2019)
- [European Union regulations on algorithmic decision-making and a "right to explanation"](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1606.08813/) (2016)
- [Performative Prediction](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2002.06673/) (2020)
- [Strategic Classification](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1506.06980/) (2015)
- [Algorithmic Recourse: from Counterfactual Explanations to Interventions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2002.06278/) (2020)
- [Strategic Classification from Revealed Preferences](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1710.07887/) (2017)
- [The Social Cost of Strategic Classification](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1808.08460/) (2018)
- [Strategic Classification is Causal Modeling in Disguise](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1910.10362/) (2019)
- [How Do Classifiers Induce Agents To Invest Effort Strategically?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1807.05307/) (2018)
- [The Disparate Effects of Strategic Manipulation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1808.08646/) (2018)
- [Strategic Classification in the Dark](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2102.11592/) (2021)
- [Causal Strategic Linear Regression](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2002.10066/) (2020)
- [Strategic Classification Made Practical](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2103.01826/) (2021)
- [PAC-Learning for Strategic Classification](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2012.03310/) (2020)
- [The Strategic Perceptron](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2008.01710/) (2020)
- [Information Discrepancy in Strategic Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2103.01028/) (2021)
- [Alternative Microfoundations for Strategic Classification](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2106.12705/) (2021)
- [Decisions, Counterfactual Explanations and Strategic Behavior](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2002.04333/) (2020)
- [Stateful Strategic Regression](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2106.03827/) (2021)
- [Strategic Instrumental Variable Regression: Recovering Causal Relationships From Strategic Responses](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2107.05762/) (2021)
- [RKHS-SHAP: Shapley Values for Kernel Methods](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2110.09167/) (2021)
- [Calibrated Stackelberg Games: Learning Optimal Commitments Against Calibrated Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.02704/) (2023)
- [Strategic Classification under Unknown Personalized Manipulation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.16501/) (2023)
- [From Predictions to Decisions: Using Lookahead Regularization](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2006.11638/) (2020)
- [Explaining the Uncertain: Stochastic Shapley Values for Gaussian Process Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.15167/) (2023)
- [Fundamental Bounds on Online Strategic Classification](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.12355/) (2023)
- [Bayesian Persuasion for Algorithmic Recourse](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2112.06283/) (2021)

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Off-Policy Evaluation with Strategic Agents via Local Disclosure](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.07308/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We study explanation design in algorithmic decision making with strategic agents, individuals who may modify their inputs in response to explanations of a decision maker's (DM's) predictive model. As the demand for transparent algorithmic systems continues to grow, most prior work assumes full model disclosure as the default solution. In practice, however, DMs such as financial institutions typically disclose only partial model information via explanations. Such partial disclosure can lead agents to misinterpret the model and take actions that unknowingly harm their utility. A key open question is how DMs can communicate explanations in a way that avoids harming strategic agents, while still supporting their own decision-making goals, e.g., minimising predictive error. In this work, we analyse well-known explanation methods, and establish a necessary condition to prevent explanations from misleading agents into self-harming actions. Moreover, with a conditional homogeneity assumption, we prove that action recommendation-based explanations (ARexes) are sufficient for non-harmful responses, mirroring the revelation principle in information design. To demonstrate how ARexes can be operationalised in practice, we propose a simple learning procedure that jointly optimises the predictive model and explanation policy. Experiments on synthetic and real-world tasks show that ARexes allow the DM to optimise their model's predictive performance while preserving agents' utility, offering a more refined strategy for safe and effective partial model disclosure.