# Detecting Strategic Deception Using Linear Probes

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.03407 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.03407/

## Key facts

- Cited by 68 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Probing deception, bias and beliefs, one of 13 directions in Mechanistic interpretability.
- First posted on arXiv 5 Feb 2025.

## Placed in

- Mechanistic interpretability / [Probing deception, bias and beliefs](https://mlsanity.com/mechinterp/probing-deception-bias-and-beliefs/)

## Built on by (most cited first, 30 of 68)

- [Detecting High-Stakes Interactions with Activation Probes](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.10805/) (2025)
- [No Answer Needed: Predicting LLM Answer Accuracy from Question-Only Linear Probes](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.10625/) (2025)
- [Probing and Steering Evaluation Awareness of Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.01786/) (2025)
- [Among Us: A Sandbox for Measuring and Detecting Agentic Deception](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2504.04072/) (2025)
- [FaithCoT-Bench: Benchmarking Instance-Level Faithfulness of Chain-of-Thought Reasoning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.04040/) (2025)
- [RL-Obfuscation: Can Language Models Learn to Evade Latent-Space Monitors?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.14261/) (2025)
- [Training LLMs for Honesty via Confessions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2512.08093/) (2025)
- [Representation Engineering for Large-Language Models: Survey and Research Challenges](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.17601/) (2025)
- [Qwen-Scope: Turning Sparse Features into Development Tools for Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.11887/) (2026)
- [Benchmarking Deception Probes via Black-to-White Performance Boosts](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.12691/) (2025)
- [Beyond Linear Probes: Dynamic Safety Monitoring for Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.26238/) (2025)
- [Investigating task-specific prompts and sparse autoencoders for activation monitoring](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2504.20271/) (2025)
- [Spilling the Beans: Teaching LLMs to Self-Report Their Hidden Objectives](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2511.06626/) (2025)
- [Inherent and emergent liability issues in LLM-based agentic systems: a principal-agent perspective](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2504.03255/) (2025)
- [Difficulties with Evaluating a Deception Detector for AIs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2511.22662/) (2025)
- [The Obfuscation Atlas: Mapping Where Honesty Emerges in RLVR with Deception Probes](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.15515/) (2026)
- [Combining Cost-Constrained Runtime Monitors for AI Safety](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.15886/) (2025)
- [Preference Learning with Lie Detectors can Induce Honesty or Evasion](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.13787/) (2025)
- [Probe-Rewrite-Evaluate: A Workflow for Reliable Benchmarks and Quantifying Evaluation Awareness](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.00591/) (2025)
- [The Impact of Off-Policy Training Data on Probe Generalisation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2511.17408/) (2025)
- [Neural Chameleons: Language Models Can Learn to Hide Their Thoughts from Unseen Activation Monitors](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2512.11949/) (2025)
- [PredictaBoard: Benchmarking LLM Score Predictability](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.14445/) (2025)
- [Can LLMs Lie? Investigation beyond Hallucination](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.03518/) (2025)
- [Detecting Multi-Agent Collusion Through Multi-Agent Interpretability](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.01151/) (2026)
- [Caught in the Act: a mechanistic approach to detecting deception](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.19505/) (2025)
- [From surveillance to signalling: escalation channels as environmental controls for agentic AI](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.05192/) (2025)
- [Training Agents to Self-Report Misbehavior](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.22303/) (2026)
- [Catching rationalization in the act: detecting motivated reasoning before and after CoT via activation probing](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.17199/) (2026)
- [Ensemble Monitoring for AI Control: Diverse Signals Outweigh More Compute](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.15377/) (2026)
- [Mirage Probes: How Vision Models Fake Visual Understanding](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.13870/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

AI models might use deceptive strategies as part of scheming or misaligned behaviour. Monitoring outputs alone is insufficient, since the AI might produce seemingly benign outputs while their internal reasoning is misaligned. We thus evaluate if linear probes can robustly detect deception by monitoring model activations. We test two probe-training datasets, one with contrasting instructions to be honest or deceptive (following Zou et al., 2023) and one of responses to simple roleplaying scenarios. We test whether these probes generalize to realistic settings where Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct behaves deceptively, such as concealing insider trading (Scheurer et al., 2023) and purposely underperforming on safety evaluations (Benton et al., 2024). We find that our probe distinguishes honest and deceptive responses with AUROCs between 0.96 and 0.999 on our evaluation datasets. If we set the decision threshold to have a 1% false positive rate on chat data not related to deception, our probe catches 95-99% of the deceptive responses. Overall we think white-box probes are promising for future monitoring systems, but current performance is insufficient as a robust defence against deception. Our probes' outputs can be viewed at data.apolloresearch.ai/dd and our code at github.com/ApolloResearch/deception-detection.
