# The Cost Perspective of Liquid Democracy: Feasibility and Control

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.02380 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.02380/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 11 of its 34 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 4 Feb 2025.

## Builds on (most cited first, 11 of 11)

- [The Fluid Mechanics of Liquid Democracy](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1808.01906/) (2018)
- [On Rational Delegations in Liquid Democracy](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1802.08020/) (2018)
- [Power in Liquid Democracy](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2010.07070/) (2020)
- [Enabling the Digital Democratic Revival: A Research Program for Digital Democracy](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2401.16863/) (2024)
- [Iterative Delegations in Liquid Democracy with Restricted Preferences](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1809.04362/) (2018)
- [Liquid Democracy with Ranked Delegations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2112.07509/) (2021)
- [Voting Behaviour and Power in Online Democracy: A Study of LiquidFeedback in Germany's Pirate Party](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1503.07723/) (2015)
- [Staking Pools on Blockchains](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2203.05838/) (2022)
- [Controlling Delegations in Liquid Democracy](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.07558/) (2024)
- [Who won? Winner Determination and Robustness in Liquid Democracy](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2205.05482/) (2022)
- [Reward Schemes and Committee Sizes in Proof of Stake Governance](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.10525/) (2024)

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [When Does Delegation Beat Majority? A Delegation-Based Aggregator for Multi-Sample LLM Inference](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.08098/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We examine an approval-based model of Liquid Democracy with a budget constraint on voting and delegating costs, aiming to centrally select casting voters ensuring complete representation of the electorate. From a computational complexity perspective, we focus on minimizing overall costs, maintaining short delegation paths, and preventing excessive concentration of voting power. Furthermore, we explore computational aspects of strategic control, specifically, whether external agents can change election components to influence the voting power of certain voters.