# Conversation Games and a Strategic View of the Turing Test

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.18455 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2501.18455/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 8 of its 22 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 30 Jan 2025.

## Builds on (most cited first, 8 of 8)

- [DetectGPT: Zero-Shot Machine-Generated Text Detection using Probability Curvature](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2301.11305/) (2023)
- [Understanding the planning of LLM agents: A survey](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.02716/) (2024)
- [Monte Carlo Tree Search: A Review of Recent Modifications and Applications](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2103.04931/) (2021)
- [Strategic Classification in the Dark](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2102.11592/) (2021)
- [GPT-4 is judged more human than humans in displaced and inverted Turing tests](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.08853/) (2024)
- [Hidden-Role Games: Equilibrium Concepts and Computation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.16017/) (2023)
- [Competing in a Complex Hidden Role Game with Information Set Monte Carlo Tree Search](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2005.07156/) (2020)
- [Regularized Conventions: Equilibrium Computation as a Model of Pragmatic Reasoning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.09712/) (2023)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Although many game-theoretic models replicate real interactions that often rely on natural language, explicit study of games where language is central to strategic interaction remains limited. This paper introduces the conversation game, a multi-stage, extensive-form game based on linguistic strategic interaction. We focus on a subset of the games, called verdict games. In a verdict game, two players alternate to contribute to a conversation, which is evaluated at each stage by a non-strategic judge who may render a conclusive binary verdict, or a decision to continue the dialogue. The game ends once a limit is reached or a verdict is given. We show many familiar processes, such as interrogation or a court process fall under this category. We also, show that the Turing test is an instance of verdict game, and discuss the significance of a strategic view of the Turing test in the age of advanced AI deception. We show the practical relevance of the proposed concepts by simulation experiments, and show that a strategic agent outperforms a naive agent by a high margin.