# The Manhattan Trap: Why a Race to Artificial Superintelligence is Self-Defeating

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.14749 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2501.14749/

## Key facts

- Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 22 Dec 2024.

## Built on by (most cited first, 4 of 4)

- [Misalignment or misuse? The AGI alignment tradeoff](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.03755/) (2025)
- [Against racing to AGI: Cooperation, deterrence, and catastrophic risks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.21839/) (2025)
- [AI Alignment Strategies from a Risk Perspective: Independent Safety Mechanisms or Shared Failures?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.11235/) (2025)
- [Are we Doomed to an AI Race? Why Self-Interest Could Drive Countries Towards a Moratorium on Superintelligence](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.01297/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

This paper examines the strategic dynamics of international competition to develop Artificial Superintelligence (ASI). We argue that the same assumptions that might motivate the US to race to develop ASI also imply that such a race is extremely dangerous. These assumptions--that ASI would provide a decisive military advantage and that states are rational actors prioritizing survival--imply that a race would heighten three critical risks: great power conflict, loss of control of ASI systems, and the undermining of liberal democracy. Our analysis shows that ASI presents a trust dilemma rather than a prisoners dilemma, suggesting that international cooperation to control ASI development is both preferable and strategically sound. We conclude that cooperation is achievable.