# Examining Popular Arguments Against AI Existential Risk: A Philosophical Analysis

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.04064 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2501.04064/

## Key facts

- Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 7 Jan 2025.

## Built on by (most cited first, 4 of 4)

- [AI Safety Should Prioritize the Future of Work](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2504.13959/) (2025)
- [Mind the Gap! Pathways Towards Unifying AI Safety and Ethics Research](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2512.10058/) (2025)
- [Dimensional Characterization and Pathway Modeling for Catastrophic AI Risks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.06411/) (2025)
- [Take Goodhart Seriously: Principled Limit on General-Purpose AI Optimization](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.02840/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Concerns about artificial intelligence (AI) and its potential existential risks have garnered significant attention, with figures like Geoffrey Hinton and Dennis Hassabis advocating for robust safeguards against catastrophic outcomes. Prominent scholars, such as Nick Bostrom and Max Tegmark, have further advanced the discourse by exploring the long-term impacts of superintelligent AI. However, this existential risk narrative faces criticism, particularly in popular media, where scholars like Timnit Gebru, Melanie Mitchell, and Nick Clegg argue, among other things, that it distracts from pressing current issues. Despite extensive media coverage, skepticism toward the existential risk discourse has received limited rigorous treatment in academic literature. Addressing this imbalance, this paper reconstructs and evaluates three common arguments against the existential risk perspective: the Distraction Argument, the Argument from Human Frailty, and the Checkpoints for Intervention Argument. By systematically reconstructing and assessing these arguments, the paper aims to provide a foundation for more balanced academic discourse and further research on AI.