# Exploring Secure Machine Learning Through Payload Injection and FGSM Attacks on ResNet-50

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.02147 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2501.02147/

## Key facts

- Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 12 of its 20 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 4 Jan 2025.

## Builds on (most cited first, 12 of 12)

- [Deep Residual Learning for Image Recognition](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1512.03385/) (2015)
- [Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examples](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1412.6572/) (2014)
- [Towards Deep Learning Models Resistant to Adversarial Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1706.06083/) (2017)
- [Intriguing properties of neural networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1312.6199/) (2013)
- [Towards Evaluating the Robustness of Neural Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1608.04644/) (2016)
- [Adversarial examples in the physical world](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1607.02533/) (2016)
- [Obfuscated Gradients Give a False Sense of Security: Circumventing Defenses to Adversarial Examples](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1802.00420/) (2018)
- [Ensemble Adversarial Training: Attacks and Defenses](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1705.07204/) (2017)
- [Universal adversarial perturbations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1610.08401/) (2016)
- [Wild Patterns: Ten Years After the Rise of Adversarial Machine Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1712.03141/) (2017)
- [Adversarial Examples: Attacks and Defenses for Deep Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1712.07107/) (2017)
- [DARTS: Deceiving Autonomous Cars with Toxic Signs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1802.06430/) (2018)

## Built on by (most cited first, 2 of 2)

- [SoK: Agentic Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG): Taxonomy, Architectures, Evaluation, and Research Directions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.07379/) (2026)
- [Chunking, Retrieval, and Re-ranking: An Empirical Evaluation of RAG Architectures for Policy Document Question Answering](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2601.15457/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

This paper investigates the resilience of a ResNet-50 image classification model under two prominent security threats: Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) adversarial attacks and malicious payload injection. Initially, the model attains a 53.33% accuracy on clean images. When subjected to FGSM perturbations, its overall accuracy remains unchanged; however, the model's confidence in incorrect predictions notably increases. Concurrently, a payload injection scheme is successfully executed in 93.33% of the tested samples, revealing how stealthy attacks can manipulate model predictions without degrading visual quality. These findings underscore the vulnerability of even high-performing neural networks and highlight the urgency of developing more robust defense mechanisms for security-critical applications.