# CySecBench: Generative AI-based CyberSecurity-focused Prompt Dataset for Benchmarking Large Language Models

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.01335 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2501.01335/

## Key facts

- Cited by 10 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Jailbreaking, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security.
- First posted on arXiv 2 Jan 2025.

## Placed in

- LLM safety and security / [Jailbreaking](https://mlsanity.com/safety/jailbreaking/)

## Built on by (most cited first, 10 of 10)

- [Frontier AI's Impact on the Cybersecurity Landscape](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2504.05408/) (2025)
- [PurpCode: Reasoning for Safer Code Generation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.19060/) (2025)
- [Prompt, Divide, and Conquer: Bypassing Large Language Model Safety Filters via Segmented and Distributed Prompt Processing](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.21598/) (2025)
- [Jailbreaking Large Language Models Through Content Concretization](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.12937/) (2025)
- [Beyond Context: Large Language Models' Failure to Grasp Users' Intent](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2512.21110/) (2025)
- [A Systematic Review of Algorithmic Red Teaming Methodologies for Assurance and Security of AI Applications](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.21267/) (2026)
- [Refusal Evaluation in Coding LLMs and Code Agents: A Systematic Review of Thirteen Malicious-Code Prompt Corpora (2023-2025)](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.20351/) (2026)
- [LLM Security and Safety: Insights from Homotopy-Inspired Prompt Obfuscation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2601.14528/) (2026)
- [Code as a Weapon: A Consensus-Labeled Prompt Bank for Measuring Coding-Model Compliance with Malicious-Code Requests](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.28734/) (2026)
- [AlcaTRAz - Anchored Tree-Rule Defense Against Jailbreaks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.03693/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Numerous studies have investigated methods for jailbreaking Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate harmful content. Typically, these methods are evaluated using datasets of malicious prompts designed to bypass security policies established by LLM providers. However, the generally broad scope and open-ended nature of existing datasets can complicate the assessment of jailbreaking effectiveness, particularly in specific domains, notably cybersecurity. To address this issue, we present and publicly release CySecBench, a comprehensive dataset containing 12662 prompts specifically designed to evaluate jailbreaking techniques in the cybersecurity domain. The dataset is organized into 10 distinct attack-type categories, featuring close-ended prompts to enable a more consistent and accurate assessment of jailbreaking attempts. Furthermore, we detail our methodology for dataset generation and filtration, which can be adapted to create similar datasets in other domains. To demonstrate the utility of CySecBench, we propose and evaluate a jailbreaking approach based on prompt obfuscation. Our experimental results show that this method successfully elicits harmful content from commercial black-box LLMs, achieving Success Rates (SRs) of 65% with ChatGPT and 88% with Gemini; in contrast, Claude demonstrated greater resilience with a jailbreaking SR of 17%. Compared to existing benchmark approaches, our method shows superior performance, highlighting the value of domain-specific evaluation datasets for assessing LLM security measures. Moreover, when evaluated using prompts from a widely used dataset (i.e., AdvBench), it achieved an SR of 78.5%, higher than the state-of-the-art methods.
