# How to Defend Against Large-scale Model Poisoning Attacks in Federated Learning: A Vertical Solution

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.10673 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2411.10673/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 28 of its 44 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 16 Nov 2024.

## Builds on (most cited first, 28 of 28)

- [Deep Residual Learning for Image Recognition](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1512.03385/) (2015)
- [Adam: A Method for Stochastic Optimization](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1412.6980/) (2014)
- [Learning Transferable Visual Models From Natural Language Supervision](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2103.00020/) (2021)
- [Communication-Efficient Learning of Deep Networks from Decentralized Data](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1602.05629/) (2016)
- [Membership Inference Attacks against Machine Learning Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1610.05820/) (2016)
- [Scaling Autoregressive Models for Content-Rich Text-to-Image Generation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2206.10789/) (2022)
- [On the Convergence of FedAvg on Non-IID Data](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1907.02189/) (2019)
- [Targeted Backdoor Attacks on Deep Learning Systems Using Data Poisoning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1712.05526/) (2017)
- [How To Backdoor Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1807.00459/) (2018)
- [Inverting Gradients -- How easy is it to break privacy in federated learning?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2003.14053/) (2020)
- [Byzantine-Robust Distributed Learning: Towards Optimal Statistical Rates](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1803.01498/) (2018)
- [Exploiting Unintended Feature Leakage in Collaborative Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1805.04049/) (2018)
- [Local Model Poisoning Attacks to Byzantine-Robust Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1911.11815/) (2019)
- [FLTrust: Byzantine-robust Federated Learning via Trust Bootstrapping](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2012.13995/) (2020)
- [The Hidden Vulnerability of Distributed Learning in Byzantium](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1802.07927/) (2018)
- [A Little Is Enough: Circumventing Defenses For Distributed Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1902.06156/) (2019)
- [Very Deep VAEs Generalize Autoregressive Models and Can Outperform Them on Images](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2011.10650/) (2020)
- [Deep Generative Modelling: A Comparative Review of VAEs, GANs, Normalizing Flows, Energy-Based and Autoregressive Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2103.04922/) (2021)
- [A Convergence Analysis of Gradient Descent for Deep Linear Neural Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1810.02281/) (2018)
- [Convergence Analysis of Two-layer Neural Networks with ReLU Activation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1705.09886/) (2017)
- [FLDetector: Defending Federated Learning Against Model Poisoning Attacks via Detecting Malicious Clients](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2207.09209/) (2022)
- [Narcissus: A Practical Clean-Label Backdoor Attack with Limited Information](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2204.05255/) (2022)
- [Wild Patterns Reloaded: A Survey of Machine Learning Security against Training Data Poisoning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2205.01992/) (2022)
- [MPAF: Model Poisoning Attacks to Federated Learning based on Fake Clients](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2203.08669/) (2022)
- [Untargeted Attack against Federated Recommendation Systems via Poisonous Item Embeddings and the Defense](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2212.05399/) (2022)
- [A Dual Stealthy Backdoor: From Both Spatial and Frequency Perspectives](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.10184/) (2023)
- [RFLPA: A Robust Federated Learning Framework against Poisoning Attacks with Secure Aggregation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.15182/) (2024)
- [QUEEN: Query Unlearning against Model Extraction](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.01251/) (2024)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Federated learning (FL) is vulnerable to model poisoning attacks due to its distributed nature. The current defenses start from all user gradients (model updates) in each communication round and solve for the optimal aggregation gradients (horizontal solution). This horizontal solution will completely fail when facing large-scale (>50%) model poisoning attacks. In this work, based on the key insight that the convergence process of the model is a highly predictable process, we break away from the traditional horizontal solution of defense and innovatively transform the problem of solving the optimal aggregation gradients into a vertical solution problem. We propose VERT, which uses global communication rounds as the vertical axis, trains a predictor using historical gradients information to predict user gradients, and compares the similarity with actual user gradients to precisely and efficiently select the optimal aggregation gradients. In order to reduce the computational complexity of VERT, we design a low dimensional vector projector to project the user gradients to a computationally acceptable length, and then perform subsequent predictor training and prediction tasks. Exhaustive experiments show that VERT is efficient and scalable, exhibiting excellent large-scale (>=80%) model poisoning defense effects under different FL scenarios. In addition, we can design projector with different structures for different model structures to adapt to aggregation servers with different computing power.