# Fair Division with Market Values

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.23137 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.23137/

## Key facts

- Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 18 of its 35 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 30 Oct 2024.

## Builds on (most cited first, 18 of 18)

- [FairRec: Two-Sided Fairness for Personalized Recommendations in Two-Sided Platforms](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2002.10764/) (2020)
- [Fair Public Decision Making](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1611.04034/) (2016)
- [Best of Both Worlds: Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Fairness in Resource Allocation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2005.14122/) (2020)
- [A Little Charity Guarantees Almost Envy-Freeness](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1907.04596/) (2019)
- [Fair Division Under Cardinality Constraints](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1804.09521/) (2018)
- [Almost Envy-Freeness in Group Resource Allocation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1901.08463/) (2019)
- [Equitable Allocations of Indivisible Goods](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1905.10656/) (2019)
- [A Discrete and Bounded Envy-Free Cake Cutting Protocol for Any Number of Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1604.03655/) (2016)
- [Breaking the 3/4 Barrier for Approximate Maximin Share](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.07304/) (2023)
- [Fair Division with Allocator's Preference](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.03475/) (2023)
- [Two-Sided Matching Meets Fair Division](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2107.07404/) (2021)
- [Fair Division with Two-Sided Preferences](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2206.05879/) (2022)
- [Computing Pareto-Optimal and Almost Envy-Free Allocations of Indivisible Goods](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2204.14229/) (2022)
- [On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2010.07280/) (2020)
- [Finding Fair Allocations under Budget Constraints](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2208.08168/) (2022)
- [Monotonicity and Competitive Equilibrium in Cake-cutting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1510.05229/) (2015)
- [Continuity Assumptions in Cake-Cutting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1611.04988/) (2016)
- [Fair Division of Goods in the Shadow of Market Values](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1910.01615/) (2019)

## Built on by (most cited first, 3 of 3)

- [Simultaneously Fair Allocation of Indivisible Items Across Multiple Dimensions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.21727/) (2025)
- [Collaborating with GenAI: Incentives and Replacements](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.20213/) (2025)
- [Exact Cut Complexity of Equal-Length Proportional Cake Cutting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.19733/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We introduce a model of fair division with market values, where indivisible goods must be partitioned among agents with (additive) subjective valuations, and each good additionally has a market value. The market valuation can be viewed as a separate additive valuation that holds identically across all the agents. We seek allocations that are simultaneously fair with respect to the subjective valuations and with respect to the market valuation. We show that an allocation that satisfies stochastically-dominant envy-freeness up to one good (SD-EF1) with respect to both the subjective valuations and the market valuation does not always exist, but the weaker guarantee of EF1 with respect to the subjective valuations along with SD-EF1 with respect to the market valuation can be guaranteed. We also study a number of other guarantees such as Pareto optimality, EFX, and MMS. In addition, we explore non-additive valuations and extend our model to cake-cutting. Along the way, we identify several tantalizing open questions.