# Exposing Cross-Platform Coordinated Inauthentic Activity in the Run-Up to the 2024 U.S. Election

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.22716 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.22716/

## Key facts

- Cited by 7 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 30 Oct 2024.

## Built on by (most cited first, 7 of 7)

- [GORAG: Graph-based Online Retrieval Augmented Generation for Dynamic Few-shot Social Media Text Classification](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2501.02844/) (2025)
- [Emergent Coordinated Behaviors in Networked LLM Agents: Modeling the Strategic Dynamics of Information Operations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.25003/) (2025)
- [The Generative AI Paradox: GenAI and the Erosion of Trust, the Corrosion of Information Verification, and the Demise of Truth](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2601.00306/) (2026)
- [Machines in the Crowd? Measuring the Footprint of Machine-Generated Text on Reddit](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.07226/) (2025)
- [Beyond Content: Behavioral Policies Reveal Actors in Information Operations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.02838/) (2026)
- [Detecting Synthetic Political Narratives in Cross-Platform Social Media Discourse](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.21540/) (2026)
- [Predicting, Evaluating, and Explaining Top Misinformation Spreaders via Archetypal User Behavior](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.16323/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Coordinated information operations remain a persistent challenge on social media, despite platform efforts to curb them. While previous research has primarily focused on identifying these operations within individual platforms, this study shows that coordination frequently transcends platform boundaries. Leveraging newly collected data of online conversations related to the 2024 U.S. Election across mathbbX (formerly, Twitter), Facebook, and Telegram, we construct similarity networks to detect coordinated communities exhibiting suspicious sharing behaviors within and across platforms. Proposing an advanced coordination detection model, we reveal evidence of potential foreign interference, with Russian-affiliated media being systematically promoted across Telegram and mathbbX. Our analysis also uncovers substantial intra- and cross-platform coordinated inauthentic activity, driving the spread of highly partisan, low-credibility, and conspiratorial content. These findings highlight the urgent need for regulatory measures that extend beyond individual platforms to effectively address the growing challenge of cross-platform coordinated influence campaigns.