# Learning Neural Strategy-Proof Matching Mechanism from Examples

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.19384 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.19384/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 13 of its 52 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 25 Oct 2024.

## Builds on (most cited first, 13 of 13)

- [Attention Is All You Need](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1706.03762/) (2017)
- [SoftSort: A Continuous Relaxation for the argsort Operator](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2006.16038/) (2020)
- [Complexity of Mechanism Design](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1408.1486/) (2014)
- [Automated Mechanism Design via Neural Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1805.03382/) (2018)
- [A Permutation-Equivariant Neural Network Architecture For Auction Design](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2003.01497/) (2020)
- [A Scalable Neural Network for DSIC Affine Maximizer Auction Design](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.12162/) (2023)
- [PreferenceNet: Encoding Human Preferences in Auction Design with Deep Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2106.03215/) (2021)
- [Differentiable Economics for Randomized Affine Maximizer Auctions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2202.02872/) (2022)
- [A Context-Integrated Transformer-Based Neural Network for Auction Design](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2201.12489/) (2022)
- [Deep Learning for Two-Sided Matching](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2107.03427/) (2021)
- [Learning Revenue-Maximizing Auctions With Differentiable Matching](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2106.07877/) (2021)
- [Daycare Matching in Japan: Transfers and Siblings](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2212.02751/) (2022)
- [Mechanism Design for Public Projects via Neural Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2002.11382/) (2020)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Designing two-sided matching mechanisms is challenging when practical demands for matching outcomes are difficult to formalize and the designed mechanism must satisfy theoretical conditions. To address this, prior work has proposed a framework that learns a matching mechanism from examples, using a parameterized family that satisfies properties such as stability. However, despite its usefulness, this framework does not guarantee strategy-proofness (SP), and cannot handle varying numbers of agents or incorporate publicly available contextual information about agents, both of which are crucial in real-world applications. In this paper, we propose a new parametrized family of matching mechanisms that always satisfy strategy-proofness, are applicable for an arbitrary number of agents, and deal with public contextual information of agents, based on the serial dictatorship (SD). This family is represented by NeuralSD, a novel neural network architecture based on SD, where agent rankings in SD are treated as learnable parameters computed from agents' contexts using an attention-based sub-network. To enable learning, we introduce tensor serial dictatorship (TSD), a differentiable relaxation of SD using tensor operations. This allows NeuralSD to be trained end-to-end from example matchings while satisfying SP. We conducted experiments to learn a matching mechanism from matching examples while satisfying SP. We demonstrated that our method outperformed baselines in predicting matchings and on several metrics for goodness of matching outcomes.