# On the Minimal Theory of Consciousness Implicit in Active Inference

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.06633 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.06633/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 9 Oct 2024.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Gradland: On Phenomenal Experience, Differentiated Across Many Dimensions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.09306/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

The multifaceted nature of subjective experience poses a challenge to the study of consciousness. Traditional neuroscientific approaches often concentrate on isolated facets, such as perceptual awareness or the global state of consciousness and construct a theory around the relevant empirical paradigms and findings. Theories of consciousness are, therefore, often difficult to compare; indeed, there might be little overlap in the phenomena such theories aim to explain. Here, we take a different approach: starting with active inference, a first principles framework for modelling behaviour as (approximate) Bayesian inference, and building up to a minimal theory of consciousness, which emerges from the shared features of computational models derived under active inference. We review a body of work applying active inference models to the study of consciousness and argue that there is implicit in all these models a small set of theoretical commitments that point to a minimal (and testable) theory of consciousness.