# Federated Learning Nodes Can Reconstruct Peers' Image Data

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.04661 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.04661/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 23 of its 33 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 7 Oct 2024.

## Builds on (most cited first, 23 of 23)

- [Deep Residual Learning for Image Recognition](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1512.03385/) (2015)
- [Denoising Diffusion Probabilistic Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2006.11239/) (2020)
- [The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Deep Features as a Perceptual Metric](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1801.03924/) (2018)
- [Diffusion Models Beat GANs on Image Synthesis](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2105.05233/) (2021)
- [Communication-Efficient Learning of Deep Networks from Decentralized Data](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1602.05629/) (2016)
- [Advances and Open Problems in Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1912.04977/) (2019)
- [On the Convergence of FedAvg on Non-IID Data](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1907.02189/) (2019)
- [Deep Leakage from Gradients](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1906.08935/) (2019)
- [Denoising Diffusion Restoration Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2201.11793/) (2022)
- [Inverting Gradients -- How easy is it to break privacy in federated learning?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2003.14053/) (2020)
- [iDLG: Improved Deep Leakage from Gradients](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2001.02610/) (2020)
- [See through Gradients: Image Batch Recovery via GradInversion](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2104.07586/) (2021)
- [MDTv2: Masked Diffusion Transformer is a Strong Image Synthesizer](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.14389/) (2023)
- [Back to the Drawing Board: A Critical Evaluation of Poisoning Attacks on Production Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2108.10241/) (2021)
- [Robbing the Fed: Directly Obtaining Private Data in Federated Learning with Modified Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2110.13057/) (2021)
- [Provable Defense against Privacy Leakage in Federated Learning from Representation Perspective](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2012.06043/) (2020)
- [Fishing for User Data in Large-Batch Federated Learning via Gradient Magnification](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2202.00580/) (2022)
- [Challenges and Approaches for Mitigating Byzantine Attacks in Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2112.14468/) (2021)
- [Gradient Disaggregation: Breaking Privacy in Federated Learning by Reconstructing the User Participant Matrix](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2106.06089/) (2021)
- [Gradient Obfuscation Gives a False Sense of Security in Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2206.04055/) (2022)
- [LOKI: Large-scale Data Reconstruction Attack against Federated Learning through Model Manipulation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.12233/) (2023)
- [Scale-MIA: A Scalable Model Inversion Attack against Secure Federated Learning via Latent Space Reconstruction](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.05808/) (2023)
- [Is Network the Bottleneck of Distributed Training?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2006.10103/) (2020)

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [On Model Protection in Federated Learning against Eavesdropping Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2504.02114/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Federated learning (FL) is a privacy-preserving machine learning framework that enables multiple nodes to train models on their local data and periodically average weight updates to benefit from other nodes' training. Each node's goal is to collaborate with other nodes to improve the model's performance while keeping its training data private. However, this framework does not guarantee data privacy. Prior work has shown that the gradient-sharing steps in FL can be vulnerable to data reconstruction attacks from an honest-but-curious central server. In this work, we show that an honest-but-curious node/client can also launch attacks to reconstruct peers' image data through gradient inversion, presenting a severe privacy risk. We demonstrate that a single client can silently reconstruct other clients' private images using diluted information available within consecutive updates. We leverage state-of-the-art diffusion models to enhance the perceptual quality and recognizability of the reconstructed images, further demonstrating the risk of information leakage at a semantic level. This highlights the need for more robust privacy-preserving mechanisms that protect against silent client-side attacks during federated training.