# Privacy Attack in Federated Learning is Not Easy: An Experimental Study

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2409.19301 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2409.19301/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 76 of its 124 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 28 Sep 2024.

## Builds on (most cited first, 30 of 76)

- [Very Deep Convolutional Networks for Large-Scale Image Recognition](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1409.1556/) (2014)
- [ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1409.0575/) (2014)
- [Communication-Efficient Learning of Deep Networks from Decentralized Data](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1602.05629/) (2016)
- [Generative Adversarial Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2203.00667/) (2022)
- [Extracting Training Data from Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2012.07805/) (2020)
- [Deep Image Prior](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1711.10925/) (2017)
- [Deep Leakage from Gradients](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1906.08935/) (2019)
- [How To Backdoor Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1807.00459/) (2018)
- [Inverting Gradients -- How easy is it to break privacy in federated learning?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2003.14053/) (2020)
- [Language Modeling with Gated Convolutional Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1612.08083/) (2016)
- [Federated Learning for Mobile Keyboard Prediction](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1811.03604/) (2018)
- [Exploiting Unintended Feature Leakage in Collaborative Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1805.04049/) (2018)
- [Local Model Poisoning Attacks to Byzantine-Robust Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1911.11815/) (2019)
- [Differentially Private Federated Learning: A Client Level Perspective](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1712.07557/) (2017)
- [Dreaming to Distill: Data-free Knowledge Transfer via DeepInversion](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1912.08795/) (2019)
- [Understanding Deep Image Representations by Inverting Them](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1412.0035/) (2014)
- [iDLG: Improved Deep Leakage from Gradients](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2001.02610/) (2020)
- [The CMA Evolution Strategy: A Tutorial](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1604.00772/) (2016)
- [A Survey on Federated Learning Systems: Vision, Hype and Reality for Data Privacy and Protection](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1907.09693/) (2019)
- [Scalable Global Optimization via Local Bayesian Optimization](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1910.01739/) (2019)
- [Analyzing Federated Learning through an Adversarial Lens](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1811.12470/) (2018)
- [Deep Models Under the GAN: Information Leakage from Collaborative Deep Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1702.07464/) (2017)
- [See through Gradients: Image Batch Recovery via GradInversion](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2104.07586/) (2021)
- [Attack of the Tails: Yes, You Really Can Backdoor Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2007.05084/) (2020)
- [Beyond Inferring Class Representatives: User-Level Privacy Leakage From Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1812.00535/) (2018)
- [The Secret Revealer: Generative Model-Inversion Attacks Against Deep Neural Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1911.07135/) (2019)
- [Learning with Pseudo-Ensembles](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1412.4864/) (2014)
- [Information Leakage in Embedding Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2004.00053/) (2020)
- [A Survey on Homomorphic Encryption Schemes: Theory and Implementation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1704.03578/) (2017)
- [When the Curious Abandon Honesty: Federated Learning Is Not Private](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2112.02918/) (2021)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Federated learning (FL) is an emerging distributed machine learning paradigm proposed for privacy preservation. Unlike traditional centralized learning approaches, FL enables multiple users to collaboratively train a shared global model without disclosing their own data, thereby significantly reducing the potential risk of privacy leakage. However, recent studies have indicated that FL cannot entirely guarantee privacy protection, and attackers may still be able to extract users' private data through the communicated model gradients. Although numerous privacy attack FL algorithms have been developed, most are designed to reconstruct private data from a single step of calculated gradients. It remains uncertain whether these methods are effective in realistic federated environments or if they have other limitations. In this paper, we aim to help researchers better understand and evaluate the effectiveness of privacy attacks on FL. We analyze and discuss recent research papers on this topic and conduct experiments in a real FL environment to compare the performance of various attack methods. Our experimental results reveal that none of the existing state-of-the-art privacy attack algorithms can effectively breach private client data in realistic FL settings, even in the absence of defense strategies. This suggests that privacy attacks in FL are more challenging than initially anticipated.