# Friend- and Enemy-oriented Hedonic Games With Strangers Full Version

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2409.16579 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2409.16579/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 25 Sep 2024.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Metric Hedonic Games on the Line](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.05888/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We introduce friend- and enemy-oriented hedonic games with strangers (FOHGS and EOHGS respectively), two classes of hedonic games wherein agents are classified as friends, enemies, or strangers under the assumption that strangers will become either friends or enemies ex post facto. For several notions of stability in FOHGS and EOHGS, we characterize the hardness of verification for possible and necessary stability. We characterize the hardness of deciding whether possibly and necessarily X stable partitions exist for a given stability notion X. We prove that necessarily internally stable partitions always exist and provide sufficient conditions for necessary contractual individual stability.