# Method of Equal Shares with Bounded Overspending

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2409.15005 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2409.15005/

## Key facts

- Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 17 of its 26 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 23 Sep 2024.

## Builds on (most cited first, 17 of 17)

- [Justified Representation in Approval-Based Committee Voting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1407.8269/) (2014)
- [Multi-Winner Voting with Approval Preferences](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2007.01795/) (2020)
- [Proportional Participatory Budgeting with Additive Utilities](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2008.13276/) (2020)
- [Robust and Verifiable Proportionality Axioms for Multiwinner Voting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.01989/) (2023)
- [Proportionality and the Limits of Welfarism](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1911.11747/) (2019)
- [The Core of the Participatory Budgeting Problem](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1610.03474/) (2016)
- [Fair mixing: the case of dichotomous preferences](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1712.02542/) (2017)
- [Participatory Budgeting: Data, Tools, and Analysis](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.11035/) (2023)
- [The (Computational) Social Choice Take on Indivisible Participatory Budgeting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.00621/) (2023)
- [A verifiably secure and proportional committee election rule](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2004.12990/) (2020)
- [Proportionality in Approval-Based Participatory Budgeting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.03672/) (2023)
- [Approximate Core for Committee Selection via Multilinear Extension and Market Clearing](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2110.12499/) (2021)
- [Approval-Based Voting with Mixed Goods](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2211.12647/) (2022)
- [Truthful Cake Sharing](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2112.05632/) (2021)
- [Proportional Budget Allocations: Towards a Systematization](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2203.12324/) (2022)
- [Participatory Budgeting Design for the Real World](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.13316/) (2023)
- [Maximum Flow is Fair: A Network Flow Approach to Committee Voting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.14907/) (2024)

## Built on by (most cited first, 4 of 4)

- [Proportional Selection in Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.03545/) (2025)
- [Fair Voting Methods as a Catalyst for Democratic Resilience: A Trilogy on Legitimacy, Impact and AI Safeguarding](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2512.17461/) (2025)
- [Fairness in the Multi-Secretary Problem](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2511.23097/) (2025)
- [A General Theory of Proportionality with Additive Utilities](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.08504/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

In participatory budgeting (PB), voters decide through voting which subset of projects to fund within a given budget. Proportionality in the context of PB is crucial to ensure equal treatment of all groups of voters. However, pure proportional rules can sometimes lead to suboptimal outcomes. We introduce the Method of Equal Shares with Bounded Overspending (BOS Equal Shares), a robust variant of Equal Shares that balances proportionality and efficiency. BOS Equal Shares addresses inefficiencies implied by strict proportionality axioms, yet the rule still provides fairness guarantees, similar to the original Method of Equal Shares. Our extensive empirical analysis on real-world PB instances shows excellent performance of BOS Equal Shares across several metrics. In the course of the analysis, we also present and examine a fractional variant of the Method of Equal Shares which allows for partial funding of projects.