# Evolutionary mechanisms that promote cooperation may not promote social welfare

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.05373 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2408.05373/

## Key facts

- Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 15 of its 79 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 9 Aug 2024.

## Builds on (most cited first, 15 of 15)

- [Statistical physics of human cooperation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1705.07161/) (2017)
- [Mathematical foundations of moral preferences](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2101.08193/) (2021)
- [When to (or not to) trust intelligent machines: Insights from an evolutionary game theory analysis of trust in repeated games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2007.11338/) (2020)
- [The Windfall Clause: Distributing the Benefits of AI for the Common Good](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1912.11595/) (2019)
- [Regulatory Markets for AI Safety](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2001.00078/) (2019)
- [Voluntary safety commitments provide an escape from over-regulation in AI development](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2104.03741/) (2021)
- [Language-based game theory in the age of artificial intelligence](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.08944/) (2024)
- [Mediating Artificial Intelligence Developments through Negative and Positive Incentives](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2010.00403/) (2020)
- [Cost efficiency of institutional incentives in finite populations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2103.01131/) (2021)
- [Social Diversity Reduces the Complexity and Cost of Fostering Fairness](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2211.10517/) (2022)
- [Exploring optimal institutional incentives for public cooperation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1907.10989/) (2019)
- [Institutional Incentives for the Evolution of Committed Cooperation: Ensuring Participation is as Important as Enhancing Compliance](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2110.13307/) (2021)
- [Probabilistic sharing solves the problem of costly punishment](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1408.1945/) (2014)
- [Making an Example: Signalling Threat in the Evolution of Cooperation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2001.08245/) (2020)
- [Words are not Wind -- How Public Joint Commitment and Reputation Solve the Prisoner's Dilemma](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.06898/) (2023)

## Built on by (most cited first, 3 of 3)

- [Strategic commitments shape collective cybersecurity under AI inequality](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.09415/) (2026)
- [Social welfare optimisation in well-mixed and structured populations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2512.07453/) (2025)
- [Social welfare optimisation under institutional reward and punishment](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.31330/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Understanding the emergence of prosocial behaviours among self-interested individuals is an important problem in many scientific disciplines. Various mechanisms have been proposed to explain the evolution of such behaviours, primarily seeking the conditions under which a given mechanism can induce highest levels of cooperation. As these mechanisms usually involve costs that alter individual payoffs, it is however possible that aiming for highest levels of cooperation might be detrimental for social welfare -- the later broadly defined as the total population payoff, taking into account all costs involved for inducing increased prosocial behaviours. Herein, by comparatively analysing the social welfare and cooperation levels obtained from stochastic evolutionary models of two well-established mechanisms of prosocial behaviour, namely, peer and institutional incentives, we demonstrate exactly that. We show that the objectives of maximising cooperation levels and the objectives of maximising social welfare are often misaligned. We argue for the need of adopting social welfare as the main optimisation objective when designing and implementing evolutionary mechanisms for social and collective goods.