# Meta-mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions over Social Networks

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.04555 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2408.04555/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 8 Aug 2024.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Strategyproofness and Monotone Allocation of Auction in Social Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.14472/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Recently there has been a large amount of research designing mechanisms for auction scenarios where the bidders are connected in a social network. Different from the existing studies in this field that focus on specific auction scenarios e.g. single-unit auction and multi-unit auction, this paper considers the following question: is it possible to design a scheme that, given a classical auction scenario and a mechanism tildeM suited for it, produces a mechanism in the network setting that preserves the key properties of tildeM? To answer this question, we design meta-mechanisms that provide a uniform way of transforming mechanisms from classical models to mechanisms over networks and prove that the desirable properties are preserved by our meta-mechanisms. Our meta-mechanisms provide solutions to combinatorial auction scenarios in the network setting: (1) combinatorial auction with single-minded buyers and (2) combinatorial auction with general monotone valuation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that designs combinatorial auctions over a social network.