# Mitigating Malicious Attacks in Federated Learning via Confidence-aware Defense

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.02813 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2408.02813/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Federated unlearning and poisoning, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security.
- Builds on 16 of its 31 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 5 Aug 2024.

## Placed in

- LLM safety and security / [Federated unlearning and poisoning](https://mlsanity.com/safety/federated-unlearning-and-poisoning/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 16 of 16)

- [PyTorch: An Imperative Style, High-Performance Deep Learning Library](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1912.01703/) (2019)
- [Very Deep Convolutional Networks for Large-Scale Image Recognition](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1409.1556/) (2014)
- [Communication-Efficient Learning of Deep Networks from Decentralized Data](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1602.05629/) (2016)
- [Dropout as a Bayesian Approximation: Representing Model Uncertainty in Deep Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1506.02142/) (2015)
- [Fashion-MNIST: a Novel Image Dataset for Benchmarking Machine Learning Algorithms](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1708.07747/) (2017)
- [Simple and Scalable Predictive Uncertainty Estimation using Deep Ensembles](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1612.01474/) (2016)
- [Byzantine-Robust Distributed Learning: Towards Optimal Statistical Rates](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1803.01498/) (2018)
- [Local Model Poisoning Attacks to Byzantine-Robust Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1911.11815/) (2019)
- [Data Poisoning Attacks Against Federated Learning Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2007.08432/) (2020)
- [Can You Really Backdoor Federated Learning?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1911.07963/) (2019)
- [FLDetector: Defending Federated Learning Against Model Poisoning Attacks via Detecting Malicious Clients](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2207.09209/) (2022)
- [Survey on Federated Learning Threats: concepts, taxonomy on attacks and defences, experimental study and challenges](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2201.08135/) (2022)
- [Byzantine-Robust Federated Machine Learning through Adaptive Model Averaging](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1909.05125/) (2019)
- [Federated Learning on Heterogeneous and Long-Tailed Data via Classifier Re-Training with Federated Features](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2204.13399/) (2022)
- [Challenges and Approaches for Mitigating Byzantine Attacks in Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2112.14468/) (2021)
- [On the Vulnerability of Backdoor Defenses for Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2301.08170/) (2023)

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Task-Agnostic Federation over Decentralized Data: Research Landscape and Visions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.03140/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Federated Learning (FL) is a distributed machine learning diagram that enables multiple clients to collaboratively train a global model without sharing their private local data. However, FL systems are vulnerable to attacks that are happening in malicious clients through data poisoning and model poisoning, which can deteriorate the performance of aggregated global model. Existing defense methods typically focus on mitigating specific types of poisoning and are often ineffective against unseen types of attack. These methods also assume an attack happened moderately while is not always holds true in real. Consequently, these methods can significantly fail in terms of accuracy and robustness when detecting and addressing updates from attacked malicious clients. To overcome these challenges, in this work, we propose a simple yet effective framework to detect malicious clients, namely Confidence-Aware Defense (CAD), that utilizes the confidence scores of local models as criteria to evaluate the reliability of local updates. Our key insight is that malicious attacks, regardless of attack type, will cause the model to deviate from its previous state, thus leading to increased uncertainty when making predictions. Therefore, CAD is comprehensively effective for both model poisoning and data poisoning attacks by accurately identifying and mitigating potential malicious updates, even under varying degrees of attacks and data heterogeneity. Experimental results demonstrate that our method significantly enhances the robustness of FL systems against various types of attacks across various scenarios by achieving higher model accuracy and stability.