# Subsidizing a New Technology: An Impulse Stackelberg Game Approach

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.05393 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.05393/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 7 Jul 2024.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Strategic commitments shape collective cybersecurity under AI inequality](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.09415/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Governments are motivated to subsidize profit-driven firms that manufacture zero-emission vehicles to ensure they become price-competitive. This paper introduces a dynamic Stackelberg game to determine the government's optimal subsidy strategy for zero-emission vehicles, taking into account the pricing decisions of a profit-maximizing firm. While firms have the flexibility to change prices continuously, subsidies are adjusted at specific time intervals. This is captured in our game formulation by using impulse controls for discrete-time interventions. We provide a verification theorem to characterize the Feedback Stackelberg equilibrium and illustrate our results with numerical experiments.