# PromptFix: Few-shot Backdoor Removal via Adversarial Prompt Tuning

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.04478 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.04478/

## Key facts

- Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Backdoor and data poisoning attacks, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security.
- Builds on 34 of its 45 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 6 Jun 2024.

## Placed in

- LLM safety and security / [Backdoor and data poisoning attacks](https://mlsanity.com/safety/backdoor-and-data-poisoning-attacks/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 30 of 34)

- [Deep Residual Learning for Image Recognition](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1512.03385/) (2015)
- [BERT: Pre-training of Deep Bidirectional Transformers for Language Understanding](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1810.04805/) (2018)
- [Language Models are Few-Shot Learners](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2005.14165/) (2020)
- [RoBERTa: A Robustly Optimized BERT Pretraining Approach](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1907.11692/) (2019)
- [Towards Deep Learning Models Resistant to Adversarial Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1706.06083/) (2017)
- [PaLM: Scaling Language Modeling with Pathways](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2204.02311/) (2022)
- [The Power of Scale for Parameter-Efficient Prompt Tuning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2104.08691/) (2021)
- [Pointer Sentinel Mixture Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1609.07843/) (2016)
- [BoolQ: Exploring the Surprising Difficulty of Natural Yes/No Questions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1905.10044/) (2019)
- [BadNets: Identifying Vulnerabilities in the Machine Learning Model Supply Chain](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1708.06733/) (2017)
- [Few-Shot Parameter-Efficient Fine-Tuning is Better and Cheaper than In-Context Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2205.05638/) (2022)
- [P-Tuning v2: Prompt Tuning Can Be Comparable to Fine-tuning Universally Across Scales and Tasks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2110.07602/) (2021)
- [A Prompt Pattern Catalog to Enhance Prompt Engineering with ChatGPT](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.11382/) (2023)
- [Poison Frogs! Targeted Clean-Label Poisoning Attacks on Neural Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1804.00792/) (2018)
- [Hidden Trigger Backdoor Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1910.00033/) (2019)
- [FreeLB: Enhanced Adversarial Training for Natural Language Understanding](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1909.11764/) (2019)
- [ONION: A Simple and Effective Defense Against Textual Backdoor Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2011.10369/) (2020)
- [Adversarial Neuron Pruning Purifies Backdoored Deep Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2110.14430/) (2021)
- [A backdoor attack against LSTM-based text classification systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1905.12457/) (2019)
- [Hidden Killer: Invisible Textual Backdoor Attacks with Syntactic Trigger](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2105.12400/) (2021)
- [BadNL: Backdoor Attacks against NLP Models with Semantic-preserving Improvements](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2006.01043/) (2020)
- [Adversarial Unlearning of Backdoors via Implicit Hypergradient](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2110.03735/) (2021)
- [Backdoor Embedding in Convolutional Neural Network Models via Invisible Perturbation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1808.10307/) (2018)
- [Backdoor Attacks on Pre-trained Models by Layerwise Weight Poisoning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2108.13888/) (2021)
- [Be Careful about Poisoned Word Embeddings: Exploring the Vulnerability of the Embedding Layers in NLP Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2103.15543/) (2021)
- [Prompt as Triggers for Backdoor Attack: Examining the Vulnerability in Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.01219/) (2023)
- [Trojaning Language Models for Fun and Profit](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2008.00312/) (2020)
- [Backdoor Pre-trained Models Can Transfer to All](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2111.00197/) (2021)
- [A Unified Evaluation of Textual Backdoor Learning: Frameworks and Benchmarks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2206.08514/) (2022)
- [T-Miner: A Generative Approach to Defend Against Trojan Attacks on DNN-based Text Classification](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2103.04264/) (2021)

## Built on by (most cited first, 2 of 2)

- [Generalizable Prompt Learning of CLIP: A Brief Overview](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.01263/) (2025)
- [SafeGPT: Preventing Data Leakage and Unethical Outputs in Enterprise LLM Use](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2601.06366/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Pre-trained language models (PLMs) have attracted enormous attention over the past few years with their unparalleled performances. Meanwhile, the soaring cost to train PLMs as well as their amazing generalizability have jointly contributed to few-shot fine-tuning and prompting as the most popular training paradigms for natural language processing (NLP) models. Nevertheless, existing studies have shown that these NLP models can be backdoored such that model behavior is manipulated when trigger tokens are presented. In this paper, we propose PromptFix, a novel backdoor mitigation strategy for NLP models via adversarial prompt-tuning in few-shot settings. Unlike existing NLP backdoor removal methods, which rely on accurate trigger inversion and subsequent model fine-tuning, PromptFix keeps the model parameters intact and only utilizes two extra sets of soft tokens which approximate the trigger and counteract it respectively. The use of soft tokens and adversarial optimization eliminates the need to enumerate possible backdoor configurations and enables an adaptive balance between trigger finding and preservation of performance. Experiments with various backdoor attacks validate the effectiveness of the proposed method and the performances when domain shift is present further shows PromptFix's applicability to models pretrained on unknown data source which is the common case in prompt tuning scenarios.