# ACE: A Model Poisoning Attack on Contribution Evaluation Methods in Federated Learning

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.20975 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.20975/

## Key facts

- Cited by 5 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 51 of its 89 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 31 May 2024.

## Builds on (most cited first, 30 of 51)

- [Very Deep Convolutional Networks for Large-Scale Image Recognition](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1409.1556/) (2014)
- [Communication-Efficient Learning of Deep Networks from Decentralized Data](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1602.05629/) (2016)
- [Federated Optimization in Heterogeneous Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1812.06127/) (2018)
- [Accurate, Large Minibatch SGD: Training ImageNet in 1 Hour](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1706.02677/) (2017)
- [Federated Learning with Non-IID Data](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1806.00582/) (2018)
- [How To Backdoor Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1807.00459/) (2018)
- [Byzantine-Robust Distributed Learning: Towards Optimal Statistical Rates](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1803.01498/) (2018)
- [Local Model Poisoning Attacks to Byzantine-Robust Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1911.11815/) (2019)
- [FedProto: Federated Prototype Learning across Heterogeneous Clients](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2105.00243/) (2021)
- [FLTrust: Byzantine-robust Federated Learning via Trust Bootstrapping](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2012.13995/) (2020)
- [The Hidden Vulnerability of Distributed Learning in Byzantium](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1802.07927/) (2018)
- [Robust Aggregation for Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1912.13445/) (2019)
- [Attack of the Tails: Yes, You Really Can Backdoor Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2007.05084/) (2020)
- [A Little Is Enough: Circumventing Defenses For Distributed Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1902.06156/) (2019)
- [Towards Efficient Data Valuation Based on the Shapley Value](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1902.10275/) (2019)
- [Data Poisoning Attacks Against Federated Learning Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2007.08432/) (2020)
- [Can You Really Backdoor Federated Learning?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1911.07963/) (2019)
- [Federated Learning for Internet of Things: A Comprehensive Survey](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2104.07914/) (2021)
- [Mitigating Sybils in Federated Learning Poisoning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1808.04866/) (2018)
- [Fall of Empires: Breaking Byzantine-tolerant SGD by Inner Product Manipulation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1903.03936/) (2019)
- [Federated Learning for Open Banking](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2108.10749/) (2021)
- [Byzantine-Robust Learning on Heterogeneous Datasets via Bucketing](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2006.09365/) (2020)
- [A Principled Approach to Data Valuation for Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2009.06192/) (2020)
- [FLDetector: Defending Federated Learning Against Model Poisoning Attacks via Detecting Malicious Clients](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2207.09209/) (2022)
- [Neurotoxin: Durable Backdoors in Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2206.10341/) (2022)
- [Generalized Byzantine-tolerant SGD](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1802.10116/) (2018)
- [Collaborative Fairness in Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2008.12161/) (2020)
- [Defending against Backdoors in Federated Learning with Robust Learning Rate](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2007.03767/) (2020)
- [DeepSight: Mitigating Backdoor Attacks in Federated Learning Through Deep Model Inspection](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2201.00763/) (2022)
- [Measure Contribution of Participants in Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1909.08525/) (2019)

## Built on by (most cited first, 5 of 5)

- [Vertical Federated Learning in Practice: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.08160/) (2025)
- [On the Fragility of Contribution Score Computation in Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.19921/) (2025)
- [FRIDA: Free-Rider Detection using Privacy Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.05020/) (2024)
- [Trustless Federated Learning at Edge-Scale: A Compositional Architecture for Decentralized, Verifiable, and Incentive-Aligned Coordination](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2511.21118/) (2025)
- [Beyond performance-wise Contribution Evaluation in Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.22470/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

In Federated Learning (FL), a set of clients collaboratively train a machine learning model (called global model) without sharing their local training data. The local training data of clients is typically non-i.i.d. and heterogeneous, resulting in varying contributions from individual clients to the final performance of the global model. In response, many contribution evaluation methods were proposed, where the server could evaluate the contribution made by each client and incentivize the high-contributing clients to sustain their long-term participation in FL. Existing studies mainly focus on developing new metrics or algorithms to better measure the contribution of each client. However, the security of contribution evaluation methods of FL operating in adversarial environments is largely unexplored. In this paper, we propose the first model poisoning attack on contribution evaluation methods in FL, termed ACE. Specifically, we show that any malicious client utilizing ACE could manipulate the parameters of its local model such that it is evaluated to have a high contribution by the server, even when its local training data is indeed of low quality. We perform both theoretical analysis and empirical evaluations of ACE. Theoretically, we show our design of ACE can effectively boost the malicious client's perceived contribution when the server employs the widely-used cosine distance metric to measure contribution. Empirically, our results show ACE effectively and efficiently deceive five state-of-the-art contribution evaluation methods. In addition, ACE preserves the accuracy of the final global models on testing inputs. We also explore six countermeasures to defend ACE. Our results show they are inadequate to thwart ACE, highlighting the urgent need for new defenses to safeguard the contribution evaluation methods in FL.
