# Mitigating Exaggerated Safety in Large Language Models

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.05418 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.05418/

## Key facts

- Cited by 8 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 13 of its 18 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 8 May 2024.

## Builds on (most cited first, 13 of 13)

- [Language Models are Few-Shot Learners](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2005.14165/) (2020)
- [Training language models to follow instructions with human feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2203.02155/) (2022)
- [Llama 2: Open Foundation and Fine-Tuned Chat Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.09288/) (2023)
- [Jailbroken: How Does LLM Safety Training Fail?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.02483/) (2023)
- [RealToxicityPrompts: Evaluating Neural Toxic Degeneration in Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2009.11462/) (2020)
- [A General Language Assistant as a Laboratory for Alignment](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2112.00861/) (2021)
- [Beyond Accuracy: Behavioral Testing of NLP models with CheckList](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2005.04118/) (2020)
- [Pretraining Language Models with Human Preferences](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.08582/) (2023)
- [HateCheck: Functional Tests for Hate Speech Detection Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2012.15606/) (2020)
- [MART: Improving LLM Safety with Multi-round Automatic Red-Teaming](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.07689/) (2023)
- [Red-Teaming for Generative AI: Silver Bullet or Security Theater?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2401.15897/) (2024)
- [EvalLM: Interactive Evaluation of Large Language Model Prompts on User-Defined Criteria](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.13633/) (2023)
- [Hatemoji: A Test Suite and Adversarially-Generated Dataset for Benchmarking and Detecting Emoji-based Hate](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2108.05921/) (2021)

## Built on by (most cited first, 8 of 8)

- [Just Enough Shifts: Mitigating Over-Refusal in Aligned Language Models with Targeted Representation Fine-Tuning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.04250/) (2025)
- [Towards Comprehensive Post Safety Alignment of Large Language Models via Safety Patching](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.13820/) (2024)
- [Mix Data or Merge Models? Optimizing for Diverse Multi-Task Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.10801/) (2024)
- [EVOREFUSE: Evolutionary Prompt Optimization for Evaluation and Mitigation of LLM Over-Refusal to Pseudo-Malicious Instructions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.23473/) (2025)
- [LoRA is All You Need for Safety Alignment of Reasoning LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.17075/) (2025)
- [Reimagining Safety Alignment with An Image](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2511.00509/) (2025)
- [Palette: A Modular, Controllable, and Efficient Framework for On-demand Authorized Safety Alignment Relaxation in LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.24154/) (2026)
- [EmoRSS: Mitigating Emotion-Induced Over-Refusal in Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.04998/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

As the popularity of Large Language Models (LLMs) grow, combining model safety with utility becomes increasingly important. The challenge is making sure that LLMs can recognize and decline dangerous prompts without sacrificing their ability to be helpful. The problem of "exaggerated safety" demonstrates how difficult this can be. To reduce excessive safety behaviours -- which was discovered to be 26.1% of safe prompts being misclassified as dangerous and refused -- we use a combination of XSTest dataset prompts as well as interactive, contextual, and few-shot prompting to examine the decision bounds of LLMs such as Llama2, Gemma Command R+, and Phi-3. We find that few-shot prompting works best for Llama2, interactive prompting works best Gemma, and contextual prompting works best for Command R+ and Phi-3. Using a combination of these prompting strategies, we are able to mitigate exaggerated safety behaviors by an overall 92.9% across all LLMs. Our work presents a multiple prompting strategies to jailbreak LLMs' decision-making processes, allowing them to navigate the tight line between refusing unsafe prompts and remaining helpful.
