# Agent-Constrained Truthful Facility Location Games

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.05197 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.05197/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 8 May 2024.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Compatibility of Max and Sum Objectives for Committee Selection and k-Facility Location](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.17063/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We consider a truthful facility location problem in which there is a set of agents with private locations on the line of real numbers, and the goal is to place a number of facilities at different locations chosen from the set of those reported by the agents. Given a feasible solution, each agent suffers an individual cost that is either its total distance to all facilities (sum-variant) or its distance to the farthest facility (max-variant). For both variants, we show tight bounds on the approximation ratio of strategyproof mechanisms in terms of the social cost, the total individual cost of the agents.