# Investigating Adversarial Trigger Transfer in Large Language Models

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.16020 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.16020/

## Key facts

- Cited by 5 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Safety alignment and jailbreak attacks, one of 10 directions in LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation.
- Builds on 50 of its 63 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 24 Apr 2024.

## Placed in

- LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation / [Safety alignment and jailbreak attacks](https://mlsanity.com/alignment/safety-alignment-and-jailbreak-attacks/)
- LLM safety and security / [Jailbreaking](https://mlsanity.com/safety/jailbreaking/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 30 of 50)

- [Language Models are Few-Shot Learners](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2005.14165/) (2020)
- [PyTorch: An Imperative Style, High-Performance Deep Learning Library](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1912.01703/) (2019)
- [Training language models to follow instructions with human feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2203.02155/) (2022)
- [Llama 2: Open Foundation and Fine-Tuned Chat Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.09288/) (2023)
- [Direct Preference Optimization: Your Language Model is Secretly a Reward Model](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.18290/) (2023)
- [Deep reinforcement learning from human preferences](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1706.03741/) (2017)
- [Training a Helpful and Harmless Assistant with Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2204.05862/) (2022)
- [QLoRA: Efficient Finetuning of Quantized LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.14314/) (2023)
- [Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.15043/) (2023)
- [Scaling Instruction-Finetuned Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2210.11416/) (2022)
- [Self-Instruct: Aligning Language Models with Self-Generated Instructions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2212.10560/) (2022)
- [HuggingFace's Transformers: State-of-the-art Natural Language Processing](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1910.03771/) (2019)
- [Fine-Tuning Language Models from Human Preferences](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1909.08593/) (2019)
- [HarmBench: A Standardized Evaluation Framework for Automated Red Teaming and Robust Refusal](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.04249/) (2024)
- [Jailbreaking Black Box Large Language Models in Twenty Queries](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.08419/) (2023)
- [Llama Guard: LLM-based Input-Output Safeguard for Human-AI Conversations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.06674/) (2023)
- [Fine-tuning Aligned Language Models Compromises Safety, Even When Users Do Not Intend To!](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.03693/) (2023)
- [LIMA: Less Is More for Alignment](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.11206/) (2023)
- [Universal Adversarial Triggers for Attacking and Analyzing NLP](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1908.07125/) (2019)
- [Tree of Attacks: Jailbreaking Black-Box LLMs Automatically](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.02119/) (2023)
- [Baseline Defenses for Adversarial Attacks Against Aligned Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.00614/) (2023)
- [OLMo: Accelerating the Science of Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.00838/) (2024)
- [Jailbreaking Leading Safety-Aligned LLMs with Simple Adaptive Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.02151/) (2024)
- [Catastrophic Jailbreak of Open-source LLMs via Exploiting Generation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.06987/) (2023)
- [Jailbreak and Guard Aligned Language Models with Only Few In-Context Demonstrations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.06387/) (2023)
- [GPT-4 Is Too Smart To Be Safe: Stealthy Chat with LLMs via Cipher](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.06463/) (2023)
- [Sheared LLaMA: Accelerating Language Model Pre-training via Structured Pruning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.06694/) (2023)
- [Unnatural Instructions: Tuning Language Models with (Almost) No Human Labor](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2212.09689/) (2022)
- [Safety-Tuned LLaMAs: Lessons From Improving the Safety of Large Language Models that Follow Instructions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.07875/) (2023)
- [Principle-Driven Self-Alignment of Language Models from Scratch with Minimal Human Supervision](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.03047/) (2023)

## Built on by (most cited first, 5 of 5)

- [Failures to Find Transferable Image Jailbreaks Between Vision-Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.15211/) (2024)
- [Stealthy Jailbreak Attacks on Large Language Models via Benign Data Mirroring](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.21083/) (2024)
- [Universal Jailbreak Suffixes Are Strong Attention Hijackers](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.12880/) (2025)
- [On the Hardness of Junking LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.05116/) (2026)
- [All you need to break LLMs are Black-Box, Adapting, Efficient, Transferable, Harmful, Applicable ... Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.03647/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Recent work has developed optimization procedures to find token sequences, called adversarial triggers, which can elicit unsafe responses from aligned language models. These triggers are believed to be highly transferable, i.e., a trigger optimized on one model can jailbreak other models. In this paper, we concretely show that such adversarial triggers are not consistently transferable. We extensively investigate trigger transfer amongst 13 open models and observe poor and inconsistent transfer. Our experiments further reveal a significant difference in robustness to adversarial triggers between models Aligned by Preference Optimization (APO) and models Aligned by Fine-Tuning (AFT). We find that APO models are extremely hard to jailbreak even when the trigger is optimized directly on the model. On the other hand, while AFT models may appear safe on the surface, exhibiting refusals to a range of unsafe instructions, we show that they are highly susceptible to adversarial triggers. Lastly, we observe that most triggers optimized on AFT models also generalize to new unsafe instructions from five diverse domains, further emphasizing their vulnerability. Overall, our work highlights the need for more comprehensive safety evaluations for aligned language models.