# Jailbreaking Leading Safety-Aligned LLMs with Simple Adaptive Attacks

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.02151 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.02151/

## Key facts

- Cited by 486 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Jailbreaking, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security.
- Builds on 42 of its 65 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 2 Apr 2024.

## Placed in

- LLM safety and security / [Jailbreaking](https://mlsanity.com/safety/jailbreaking/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 30 of 42)

- [Training language models to follow instructions with human feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2203.02155/) (2022)
- [Llama 2: Open Foundation and Fine-Tuned Chat Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.09288/) (2023)
- [Towards Deep Learning Models Resistant to Adversarial Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1706.06083/) (2017)
- [Intriguing properties of neural networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1312.6199/) (2013)
- [Training a Helpful and Harmless Assistant with Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2204.05862/) (2022)
- [Mistral 7B](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.06825/) (2023)
- [Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.15043/) (2023)
- [HuggingFace's Transformers: State-of-the-art Natural Language Processing](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1910.03771/) (2019)
- [Jailbroken: How Does LLM Safety Training Fail?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.02483/) (2023)
- [HarmBench: A Standardized Evaluation Framework for Automated Red Teaming and Robust Refusal](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.04249/) (2024)
- [Jailbreaking Black Box Large Language Models in Twenty Queries](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.08419/) (2023)
- [Obfuscated Gradients Give a False Sense of Security: Circumventing Defenses to Adversarial Examples](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1802.00420/) (2018)
- [Fine-tuning Aligned Language Models Compromises Safety, Even When Users Do Not Intend To!](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.03693/) (2023)
- [AutoDAN: Generating Stealthy Jailbreak Prompts on Aligned Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.04451/) (2023)
- [Evasion Attacks against Machine Learning at Test Time](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1708.06131/) (2017)
- [Square Attack: a query-efficient black-box adversarial attack via random search](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1912.00049/) (2019)
- [Tree of Attacks: Jailbreaking Black-Box LLMs Automatically](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.02119/) (2023)
- [RobustBench: a standardized adversarial robustness benchmark](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2010.09670/) (2020)
- [Baseline Defenses for Adversarial Attacks Against Aligned Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.00614/) (2023)
- [How Johnny Can Persuade LLMs to Jailbreak Them: Rethinking Persuasion to Challenge AI Safety by Humanizing LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2401.06373/) (2024)
- [GPTFUZZER: Red Teaming Large Language Models with Auto-Generated Jailbreak Prompts](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.10253/) (2023)
- [On Adaptive Attacks to Adversarial Example Defenses](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2002.08347/) (2020)
- [JailbreakBench: An Open Robustness Benchmark for Jailbreaking Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.01318/) (2024)
- [SmoothLLM: Defending Large Language Models Against Jailbreaking Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.03684/) (2023)
- [On Evaluating Adversarial Robustness](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1902.06705/) (2019)
- [Jailbreak and Guard Aligned Language Models with Only Few In-Context Demonstrations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.06387/) (2023)
- [Wild Patterns: Ten Years After the Rise of Adversarial Machine Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1712.03141/) (2017)
- [Certified Defenses against Adversarial Examples](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1801.09344/) (2018)
- [Scalable and Transferable Black-Box Jailbreaks for Language Models via Persona Modulation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.03348/) (2023)
- [Open Sesame! Universal Black Box Jailbreaking of Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.01446/) (2023)

## Built on by (most cited first, 30 of 486)

- [Refusal in Language Models Is Mediated by a Single Direction](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.11717/) (2024)
- [Safety Alignment Should Be Made More Than Just a Few Tokens Deep](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.05946/) (2024)
- [AgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.09024/) (2024)
- [Improving Alignment and Robustness with Circuit Breakers](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.04313/) (2024)
- [Deliberative Alignment: Reasoning Enables Safer Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2412.16339/) (2024)
- [SORRY-Bench: Systematically Evaluating Large Language Model Safety Refusal](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.14598/) (2024)
- [Jailbreak Attacks and Defenses Against Large Language Models: A Survey](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.04295/) (2024)
- [Thinking with Images for Multimodal Reasoning: Foundations, Methods, and Future Frontiers](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.23918/) (2025)
- [Latent Adversarial Training Improves Robustness to Persistent Harmful Behaviors in LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.15549/) (2024)
- [LLM Defenses Are Not Robust to Multi-Turn Human Jailbreaks Yet](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2408.15221/) (2024)
- [The Attacker Moves Second: Stronger Adaptive Attacks Bypass Defenses Against Llm Jailbreaks and Prompt Injections](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.09023/) (2025)
- [Adaptive Attacks Break Defenses Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks on LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.00061/) (2025)
- [An Adversarial Perspective on Machine Unlearning for AI Safety](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2409.18025/) (2024)
- [Efficient Adversarial Training in LLMs with Continuous Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.15589/) (2024)
- [OS-Harm: A Benchmark for Measuring Safety of Computer Use Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.14866/) (2025)
- [Improved Techniques for Optimization-Based Jailbreaking on Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.21018/) (2024)
- [Machine Against the RAG: Jamming Retrieval-Augmented Generation with Blocker Documents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.05870/) (2024)
- [OverThink: Slowdown Attacks on Reasoning LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.02542/) (2025)
- [Does Refusal Training in LLMs Generalize to the Past Tense?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.11969/) (2024)
- [Best-of-N Jailbreaking](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2412.03556/) (2024)
- [Get my drift? Catching LLM Task Drift with Activation Deltas](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.00799/) (2024)
- [Improved Few-Shot Jailbreaking Can Circumvent Aligned Language Models and Their Defenses](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.01288/) (2024)
- [Instructional Segment Embedding: Improving LLM Safety with Instruction Hierarchy](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.09102/) (2024)
- [Refusal-Trained LLMs Are Easily Jailbroken As Browser Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.13886/) (2024)
- [Robust LLM safeguarding via refusal feature adversarial training](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2409.20089/) (2024)
- [SelfDefend: LLMs Can Defend Themselves against Jailbreaking in a Practical Manner](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.05498/) (2024)
- [Introducing v0.5 of the AI Safety Benchmark from MLCommons](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.12241/) (2024)
- [Trading Inference-Time Compute for Adversarial Robustness](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2501.18841/) (2025)
- [ETA: Evaluating Then Aligning Safety of Vision Language Models at Inference Time](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.06625/) (2024)
- [Don't Say No: Jailbreaking LLM by Suppressing Refusal](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.16369/) (2024)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We show that even the most recent safety-aligned LLMs are not robust to simple adaptive jailbreaking attacks. First, we demonstrate how to successfully leverage access to logprobs for jailbreaking: we initially design an adversarial prompt template (sometimes adapted to the target LLM), and then we apply random search on a suffix to maximize a target logprob (e.g., of the token "Sure"), potentially with multiple restarts. In this way, we achieve 100% attack success rate -- according to GPT-4 as a judge -- on Vicuna-13B, Mistral-7B, Phi-3-Mini, Nemotron-4-340B, Llama-2-Chat-7B/13B/70B, Llama-3-Instruct-8B, Gemma-7B, GPT-3.5, GPT-4o, and R2D2 from HarmBench that was adversarially trained against the GCG attack. We also show how to jailbreak all Claude models -- that do not expose logprobs -- via either a transfer or prefilling attack with a 100% success rate. In addition, we show how to use random search on a restricted set of tokens for finding trojan strings in poisoned models -- a task that shares many similarities with jailbreaking -- which is the algorithm that brought us the first place in the SaTML'24 Trojan Detection Competition. The common theme behind these attacks is that adaptivity is crucial: different models are vulnerable to different prompting templates (e.g., R2D2 is very sensitive to in-context learning prompts), some models have unique vulnerabilities based on their APIs (e.g., prefilling for Claude), and in some settings, it is crucial to restrict the token search space based on prior knowledge (e.g., for trojan detection). For reproducibility purposes, we provide the code, logs, and jailbreak artifacts in the JailbreakBench format at https://github.com/tml-epfl/llm-adaptive-attacks.