# Shill-Proof Auctions

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.00475 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.00475/

## Key facts

- Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 30 Mar 2024.

## Built on by (most cited first, 2 of 2)

- [The Bidding Games: Reinforcement Learning for MEV Extraction on Polygon Blockchain](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.14642/) (2025)
- [Do Not Trust The Auctioneer: Learning to Bid in Feedback-Manipulated Auctions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.22438/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We characterize single-item auction formats that are shill-proof in the sense that a profit-maximizing seller has no incentive to submit shill bids. We distinguish between strong shill-proofness, in which a seller with full knowledge of bidders' valuations can never profit from shilling, and weak shill-proofness, which requires only that the expected equilibrium profit from shilling is non-positive. The Dutch auction (with a suitable reserve) is the unique (revenue-)optimal and strongly shill-proof auction. Any deterministic auction can satisfy only two properties in the set {static, strategy-proof, weakly shill-proof}. Our main results extend to settings with affiliated and interdependent values.