# Controlling Delegations in Liquid Democracy

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.07558 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.07558/

## Key facts

- Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 12 Mar 2024.

## Built on by (most cited first, 2 of 2)

- [The Cost Perspective of Liquid Democracy: Feasibility and Control](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.02380/) (2025)
- [When Does Delegation Beat Majority? A Delegation-Based Aggregator for Multi-Sample LLM Inference](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.08098/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

In liquid democracy, agents can either vote directly or delegate their vote to a different agent of their choice. This results in a power structure in which certain agents possess more voting weight than others. As a result, it opens up certain possibilities of vote manipulation, including control and bribery, that do not exist in standard voting scenarios of direct democracy. Here we formalize a certain kind of election control -- in which an external agent may change certain delegation arcs -- and study the computational complexity of the corresponding combinatorial problem.