# Multi-Agent Contract Design beyond Binary Actions

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.13824 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.13824/

## Key facts

- Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 21 Feb 2024.

## Built on by (most cited first, 3 of 3)

- [The Pseudo-Dimension of Contracts](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2501.14474/) (2025)
- [Deep Incentive Design with Differentiable Equilibrium Blocks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.07705/) (2026)
- [Scalable Principal-Agent Contract Design via Gradient-Based Optimization](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.21177/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We study hidden-action principal-agent problems with multiple agents. Unlike previous work, we consider a general setting in which each agent has an arbitrary number of actions, and the joint action induces outcomes according to an arbitrary distribution. We study two classes of mechanisms: a class of deterministic mechanisms that is the natural extension of single-agent contracts, in which the agents play a Nash equilibrium of the game induced by the contract, and a class of randomized mechanisms that is inspired by single-agent randomized contracts and correlated equilibria.