# Automated Deterministic Auction Design with Objective Decomposition

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.11904 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.11904/

## Key facts

- Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 18 of its 39 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 19 Feb 2024.

## Builds on (most cited first, 18 of 18)

- [Optimal Auctions through Deep Learning: Advances in Differentiable Economics](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1706.03459/) (2017)
- [Automated Mechanism Design via Neural Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1805.03382/) (2018)
- [A Permutation-Equivariant Neural Network Architecture For Auction Design](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2003.01497/) (2020)
- [Neural Auction: End-to-End Learning of Auction Mechanisms for E-Commerce Advertising](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2106.03593/) (2021)
- [Auction learning as a two-player game](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2006.05684/) (2020)
- [Optimal-er Auctions through Attention](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2202.13110/) (2022)
- [Sample Complexity of Automated Mechanism Design](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1606.04145/) (2016)
- [A Scalable Neural Network for DSIC Affine Maximizer Auction Design](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.12162/) (2023)
- [PreferenceNet: Encoding Human Preferences in Auction Design with Deep Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2106.03215/) (2021)
- [Differentiable Economics for Randomized Affine Maximizer Auctions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2202.02872/) (2022)
- [Certifying Strategyproof Auction Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2006.08742/) (2020)
- [A Context-Integrated Transformer-Based Neural Network for Auction Design](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2201.12489/) (2022)
- [Deep Learning for Two-Sided Matching](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2107.03427/) (2021)
- [Learning Revenue-Maximizing Auctions With Differentiable Matching](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2106.07877/) (2021)
- [Generalization Guarantees for Multi-item Profit Maximization: Pricing, Auctions, and Randomized Mechanisms](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1705.00243/) (2017)
- [Data Market Design through Deep Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.20096/) (2023)
- [Automated Design of Affine Maximizer Mechanisms in Dynamic Settings](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.08129/) (2024)
- [Deep Automated Mechanism Design for Integrating Ad Auction and Allocation in Feed](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2401.01656/) (2024)

## Built on by (most cited first, 2 of 2)

- [Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.22911/) (2025)
- [Enhancing Affine Maximizer Auctions with Correlation-Aware Payment](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.09455/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Identifying high-revenue mechanisms that are both dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) and individually rational (IR) is a fundamental challenge in auction design. While theoretical approaches have encountered bottlenecks in multi-item auctions, there has been much empirical progress in automated designing such mechanisms using machine learning. However, existing research primarily focuses on randomized auctions, with less attention given to the more practical deterministic auctions. Therefore, this paper investigates the automated design of deterministic auctions and introduces OD-VVCA, an objective decomposition approach for automated designing Virtual Valuations Combinatorial Auctions (VVCAs). Firstly, we restrict our mechanism to deterministic VVCAs, which are inherently DSIC and IR. Afterward, we utilize a parallelizable dynamic programming algorithm to compute the allocation and revenue outcomes of a VVCA efficiently. We then decompose the revenue objective function into continuous and piecewise constant discontinuous components, optimizing each using distinct methods. Extensive experiments show that OD-VVCA achieves high revenue in multi-item auctions, especially in large-scale settings where it outperforms both randomized and deterministic baselines, indicating its efficacy and scalability.