# Computing Optimal Commitments to Strategies and Outcome-Conditional Utility Transfers

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.06626 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.06626/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 9 Feb 2024.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Game Theory with Simulation in the Presence of Unpredictable Randomisation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.14311/) (2024)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Prior work has studied the computational complexity of computing optimal strategies to commit to in Stackelberg or leadership games, where a leader commits to a strategy which is observed by one or more followers. We extend this setting to one where the leader can additionally commit to outcome-conditional utility transfers. We characterize the computational complexity of finding optimal strategies in normal-form and Bayesian games, giving a mix of efficient algorithms and NP-hardness results. Finally, we allow the leader to also commit to a signaling scheme which induces a correlated equilibrium. In this setting, optimal commitments can be found in polynomial time for arbitrarily many players.