# Nevermind: Instruction Override and Moderation in Large Language Models

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.03303 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.03303/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Jailbreaking, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security.
- Builds on 23 of its 41 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 5 Feb 2024.

## Placed in

- LLM safety and security / [Jailbreaking](https://mlsanity.com/safety/jailbreaking/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 23 of 23)

- [Training language models to follow instructions with human feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2203.02155/) (2022)
- [Llama 2: Open Foundation and Fine-Tuned Chat Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.09288/) (2023)
- [Training Verifiers to Solve Math Word Problems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2110.14168/) (2021)
- [Judging LLM-as-a-Judge with MT-Bench and Chatbot Arena](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.05685/) (2023)
- [Measuring Massive Multitask Language Understanding](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2009.03300/) (2020)
- [Think you have Solved Question Answering? Try ARC, the AI2 Reasoning Challenge](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1803.05457/) (2018)
- [HellaSwag: Can a Machine Really Finish Your Sentence?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1905.07830/) (2019)
- [Deep reinforcement learning from human preferences](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1706.03741/) (2017)
- [Mistral 7B](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.06825/) (2023)
- [Pointer Sentinel Mixture Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1609.07843/) (2016)
- [Constitutional AI: Harmlessness from AI Feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2212.08073/) (2022)
- [Learning to summarize from human feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2009.01325/) (2020)
- [Mixtral of Experts](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2401.04088/) (2024)
- [Plug and Play Language Models: A Simple Approach to Controlled Text Generation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1912.02164/) (2019)
- [Extending Context Window of Large Language Models via Positional Interpolation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.15595/) (2023)
- [DecodingTrust: A Comprehensive Assessment of Trustworthiness in GPT Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.11698/) (2023)
- [NeMo Guardrails: A Toolkit for Controllable and Safe LLM Applications with Programmable Rails](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.10501/) (2023)
- [Unlocking Efficiency in Large Language Model Inference: A Comprehensive Survey of Speculative Decoding](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2401.07851/) (2024)
- [Lexically Constrained Decoding for Sequence Generation Using Grid Beam Search](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1704.07138/) (2017)
- [Process for Adapting Language Models to Society (PALMS) with Values-Targeted Datasets](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2106.10328/) (2021)
- [Recipes for Safety in Open-domain Chatbots](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2010.07079/) (2020)
- [Mitigating harm in language models with conditional-likelihood filtration](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2108.07790/) (2021)
- [The Poison of Alignment](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.13449/) (2023)

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Model Unlearning via Sparse Autoencoder Subspace Guided Projections](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.24428/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Given the impressive capabilities of recent Large Language Models (LLMs), we investigate and benchmark the most popular proprietary and different sized open source models on the task of explicit instruction following in conflicting situations, e.g. overrides. These include the ability of the model to override the knowledge within the weights of the model, the ability to override (or moderate) extracted knowledge in the prompt, and lastly the ability to perform a full jailbreak. Experimentation performed suggest several key findings to improve instruction following - larger models perform the best in following instructions that override internal and contextual instructions, and are obedient, even to a fault. When scaling to longer contexts via rope scaling, a significant buffer needs to be maintained from the edge of the perplexity cliff in order to maintain instruction following capabilities. Finally, we observe improving instruction following, and subsequently instruction overrides/jailbreaks, is fundamentally at odds with the ability of a language model to follow given safety filters or guidelines. Thus, we postulate the most effective approach for safe, trustworthy AI should be dealt external to the LLM itself.