# Model Supply Chain Poisoning: Backdooring Pre-trained Models via Embedding Indistinguishability

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.15883 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2401.15883/

## Key facts

- Cited by 6 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 24 of its 38 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 29 Jan 2024.

## Builds on (most cited first, 24 of 24)

- [Attention Is All You Need](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1706.03762/) (2017)
- [Learning Transferable Visual Models From Natural Language Supervision](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2103.00020/) (2021)
- [An Image is Worth 16x16 Words: Transformers for Image Recognition at Scale](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2010.11929/) (2020)
- [Very Deep Convolutional Networks for Large-Scale Image Recognition](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1409.1556/) (2014)
- [A Simple Framework for Contrastive Learning of Visual Representations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2002.05709/) (2020)
- [Grad-CAM: Visual Explanations from Deep Networks via Gradient-based Localization](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1610.02391/) (2016)
- [Improved Baselines with Momentum Contrastive Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2003.04297/) (2020)
- [Big Self-Supervised Models are Strong Semi-Supervised Learners](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2006.10029/) (2020)
- [BadNets: Identifying Vulnerabilities in the Machine Learning Model Supply Chain](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1708.06733/) (2017)
- [Targeted Backdoor Attacks on Deep Learning Systems Using Data Poisoning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1712.05526/) (2017)
- [Hidden Trigger Backdoor Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1910.00033/) (2019)
- [Weight Poisoning Attacks on Pre-trained Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2004.06660/) (2020)
- [A new Backdoor Attack in CNNs by training set corruption without label poisoning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1902.11237/) (2019)
- [Neural Trojans](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1710.00942/) (2017)
- [Backdoor Attacks Against Deep Learning Systems in the Physical World](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2006.14580/) (2020)
- [Backdoor Attacks on Pre-trained Models by Layerwise Weight Poisoning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2108.13888/) (2021)
- [Trojaning Language Models for Fun and Profit](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2008.00312/) (2020)
- [Backdoor Pre-trained Models Can Transfer to All](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2111.00197/) (2021)
- [BppAttack: Stealthy and Efficient Trojan Attacks against Deep Neural Networks via Image Quantization and Contrastive Adversarial Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2205.13383/) (2022)
- [BadPre: Task-agnostic Backdoor Attacks to Pre-trained NLP Foundation Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2110.02467/) (2021)
- [Triggerless Backdoor Attack for NLP Tasks with Clean Labels](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2111.07970/) (2021)
- [Red Alarm for Pre-trained Models: Universal Vulnerability to Neuron-Level Backdoor Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2101.06969/) (2021)
- [CorruptEncoder: Data Poisoning based Backdoor Attacks to Contrastive Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2211.08229/) (2022)
- [Backdoor Attacks in the Supply Chain of Masked Image Modeling](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2210.01632/) (2022)

## Built on by (most cited first, 6 of 6)

- [Patronus: Identifying and Mitigating Transferable Backdoors in Pre-trained Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2512.06899/) (2025)
- [Weight space Detection of Backdoors in LoRA Adapters](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.15195/) (2026)
- [Cyber-Capable AI Agents: Vulnerabilities, Evaluation Containment, and Defensive Response](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2607.25379/) (2026)
- [Towards Client Driven Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.15407/) (2024)
- [BadDLM: Backdooring Diffusion Language Models with Diverse Targets](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.09397/) (2026)
- [TrojanWorld: Backdooring World-Model Agents via Imagination Steering](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.07051/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Pre-trained models (PTMs) are widely adopted across various downstream tasks in the machine learning supply chain. Adopting untrustworthy PTMs introduces significant security risks, where adversaries can poison the model supply chain by embedding hidden malicious behaviors (backdoors) into PTMs. However, existing backdoor attacks to PTMs can only achieve partially task-agnostic and the embedded backdoors are easily erased during the fine-tuning process. This makes it challenging for the backdoors to persist and propagate through the supply chain. In this paper, we propose a novel and severer backdoor attack, TransTroj, which enables the backdoors embedded in PTMs to efficiently transfer in the model supply chain. In particular, we first formalize this attack as an indistinguishability problem between poisoned and clean samples in the embedding space. We decompose embedding indistinguishability into pre- and post-indistinguishability, representing the similarity of the poisoned and reference embeddings before and after the attack. Then, we propose a two-stage optimization that separately optimizes triggers and victim PTMs to achieve embedding indistinguishability. We evaluate TransTroj on four PTMs and six downstream tasks. Experimental results show that our method significantly outperforms SOTA task-agnostic backdoor attacks -- achieving nearly 100% attack success rate on most downstream tasks -- and demonstrates robustness under various system settings. Our findings underscore the urgent need to secure the model supply chain against such transferable backdoor attacks. The code is available at https://github.com/haowang-cqu/TransTroj .