# An Experimental Comparison of Multiwinner Voting Rules on Approval Elections

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.11870 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2401.11870/

## Key facts

- Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 22 Jan 2024.

## Built on by (most cited first, 2 of 2)

- [Drawing a Map of Elections](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2504.03809/) (2025)
- [Reverse Sequential Proportional Approval Voting Rule: Proportionality and Approximation Guarantees](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.35331/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

In this paper, we experimentally compare major approval-based multiwinner voting rules. To this end, we define a measure of similarity between two equal-sized committees subject to a given election. Using synthetic elections coming from several distributions, we analyze how similar are the committees provided by prominent voting rules. Our results can be visualized as ``maps of voting rules'', which provide a counterpoint to a purely axiomatic classification of voting rules. The strength of our proposed method is its independence from preimposed classifications (such as the satisfaction of concrete axioms), and that it indeed offers a much finer distinction than the current state of axiomatic analysis.