# Responsibility in Extensive Form Games

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2312.07637 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.07637/

## Key facts

- Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 5 of its 40 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 12 Dec 2023.

## Builds on (most cited first, 5 of 5)

- [What Do We Want From Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)? -- A Stakeholder Perspective on XAI and a Conceptual Model Guiding Interdisciplinary XAI Research](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2102.07817/) (2021)
- [A Game-Theoretic Account of Responsibility Allocation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2105.09129/) (2021)
- [Blameworthiness in Strategic Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1809.05485/) (2018)
- [Truth Set Algebra: A New Way to Prove Undefinability](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2208.04422/) (2022)
- [An Axiomatic Approach to Formalized Responsibility Ascription](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2111.06711/) (2021)

## Built on by (most cited first, 2 of 2)

- [Responsibility Gap and Diffusion in Sequential Decision-Making Mechanisms](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.02582/) (2025)
- [Responsibility in a Multi-Value Strategic Setting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.17229/) (2024)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Two different forms of responsibility, counterfactual and seeing-to-it, have been extensively discussed in the philosophy and AI in the context of a single agent or multiple agents acting simultaneously. Although the generalisation of counterfactual responsibility to a setting where multiple agents act in some order is relatively straightforward, the same cannot be said about seeing-to-it responsibility. Two versions of seeing-to-it modality applicable to such settings have been proposed in the literature. Neither of them perfectly captures the intuition of responsibility. This paper proposes a definition of seeing-to-it responsibility for such settings that amalgamate the two modalities. This paper shows that the newly proposed notion of responsibility and counterfactual responsibility are not definable through each other and studies the responsibility gap for these two forms of responsibility. It shows that although these two forms of responsibility are not enough to ascribe responsibility in each possible situation, this gap does not exist if higher-order responsibility is taken into account.