# Differential Equation Approximations for Population Games using Elementary Probability

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2312.07598 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.07598/

## Key facts

- Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 11 Dec 2023.

## Built on by (most cited first, 2 of 2)

- [A Scalable Game Theoretic Approach for Coordination of Multiple Dynamic Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2409.11358/) (2024)
- [Aggregate Fictitious Play for Learning in Anonymous Polymatrix Games (Extended Version)](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.19371/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Population games model the evolution of strategic interactions among a large number of uniform agents. Due to the agents' uniformity and quantity, their aggregate strategic choices can be approximated by the solutions of a class of ordinary differential equations. This mean-field approach has found to be an effective tool of analysis. However its current proofs rely on advanced mathematical techniques, making them less accessible. In this article, we present a simpler derivation, using only undergraduate-level probability.