# Comment on "Ironing, sweeping, and multidimensional screening''

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.13012 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.13012/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 21 Nov 2023.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Deep-MacroFin: Informed Equilibrium Neural Network for Continuous Time Economic Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2408.10368/) (2024)

## Abstract (arXiv)

In their study of price discrimination for a monopolist selling heterogeneous products to consumers having private information about their own multidimensional types, Rochet and Chon'e (1998) discovered a new form of screening in which consumers with intermediate types are bunched together into isochoice groups of various dimensions incentivized to purchase the same product. They analyzed a particular example involving customer types distributed uniformly over the unit square. For this example, we prove that their proposed solution is not selfconsistent, and we indicate how consistency can be restored.