# General Framework to Evaluate Unlinkability in Biometric Template Protection Systems

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.04633 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.04633/

## Key facts

- Cited by 10 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 0 of its 64 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 8 Nov 2023.

## Built on by (most cited first, 10 of 10)

- [SlerpFace: Face Template Protection via Spherical Linear Interpolation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.03043/) (2024)
- [Reversing the Irreversible: A Survey on Inverse Biometrics](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2401.02861/) (2024)
- [CFVNet: An End-to-End Cancelable Finger Vein Network for Recognition](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2409.14774/) (2024)
- [Securing Face and Fingerprint Templates in Humanitarian Biometric Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.18415/) (2025)
- [ColorVein: Colorful Cancelable Vein Biometrics](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2504.14253/) (2025)
- [FaceAnonyMixer: Cancelable Faces via Identity Consistent Latent Space Mixing](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.05636/) (2025)
- [Cancelable Biometric Template Generation Using Random Feature Vector Transformations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.15648/) (2025)
- [FaceCloak: Learning to Protect Face Templates](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2504.06131/) (2025)
- [Picture the Epsilon: Pursuing Identity-Level Privacy Guarantees for Images](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.17147/) (2026)
- [Quantifying privacy risks in foundation model representations of brain MRI](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.20494/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

The wide deployment of biometric recognition systems in the last two decades has raised privacy concerns regarding the storage and use of biometric data. As a consequence, the ISO/IEC 24745 international standard on biometric information protection has established two main requirements for protecting biometric templates: irreversibility and unlinkability. Numerous efforts have been directed to the development and analysis of irreversible templates. However, there is still no systematic quantitative manner to analyse the unlinkability of such templates. In this paper we address this shortcoming by proposing a new general framework for the evaluation of biometric templates' unlinkability. To illustrate the potential of the approach, it is applied to assess the unlinkability of four state-of-the-art techniques for biometric template protection: biometric salting, Bloom filters, Homomorphic Encryption and block re-mapping. For the last technique, the proposed framework is compared with other existing metrics to show its advantages.