# A Generalized Extensive-Form Fictitious Play Algorithm

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2310.09658 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.09658/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 3 of its 17 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 14 Oct 2023.

## Builds on (most cited first, 3 of 3)

- [Solving Large Imperfect Information Games Using CFR+](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1407.5042/) (2014)
- [Revisiting CFR+ and Alternating Updates](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1810.11542/) (2018)
- [Regret Minimization in Behaviorally-Constrained Zero-Sum Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1711.03441/) (2017)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We introduce a simple extensive-form algorithm for finding equilibria of two-player, zero-sum games. The algorithm is realization equivalent to a generalized form of Fictitious Play. We compare its performance to that of a similar extensive-form fictitious play algorithm and a counter-factual regret minimization algorithm. All three algorithms share the same advantages over normal-form fictitious play in terms of reducing storage requirements and computational complexity. The new algorithm is intuitive and straightforward to implement, making it an appealing option for those looking for a quick and easy game solving tool.