# Free-Riding in Multi-Issue Decisions

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2310.08194 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.08194/

## Key facts

- Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 12 Oct 2023.

## Built on by (most cited first, 2 of 2)

- [Temporal Fairness in Multiwinner Voting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.04417/) (2023)
- [Not in My Backyard! Temporal Voting Over Public Chores](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.08810/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Voting in multi-issue domains allows for compromise outcomes that satisfy all voters to some extent, but such fairness considerations open the possibility of a special form of manipulation: free-riding, where voters untruthfully oppose a popular opinion in one issue to receive increased consideration in other issues; we study under which conditions this is possible and show that even weak fairness considerations enable free-riding, and through computational and experimental analysis, we find that while free-riding in multi-issue domains is often possible, it comes at a non-negligible individual risk for voters, making its allure smaller than one could intuitively assume.