# Robust Analysis of Auction Equilibria

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2310.03702 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.03702/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 5 Oct 2023.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Test-Time Compute Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2601.21839/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Equilibria in auctions can be very difficult to analyze, beyond the symmetric environments where revenue equivalence renders the analysis straightforward. This paper takes a robust approach to evaluating the equilibria of auctions. Rather than identify the equilibria of an auction under specific environmental conditions, it considers worst-case analysis, where an auction is evaluated according to the worst environment and worst equilibrium in that environment. It identifies a non-equilibrium property of auctions that governs whether or not their worst-case equilibria are good for welfare and revenue. This property is easy to analyze, can be refined from data, and composes across markets where multiple auctions are run simultaneously.