# Rational Aversion to Information

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2309.12374 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.12374/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 21 Sep 2023.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Off-Switching Not Guaranteed](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.08864/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Is more information always better? Or are there some situations in which more information can make us worse off? Good (1967) argues that expected utility maximizers should always accept more information if the information is cost-free and relevant. But Good's argument presupposes that you are certain you will update by conditionalization. If we relax this assumption and allow agents to be uncertain about updating, these agents can be rationally required to reject free and relevant information. Since there are good reasons to be uncertain about updating, rationality can require you to prefer ignorance.