# Federated Learning Incentive Mechanism under Buyers' Auction Market

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2309.05063 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.05063/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 9 of its 21 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 10 Sep 2023.

## Builds on (most cited first, 9 of 9)

- [Fashion-MNIST: a Novel Image Dataset for Benchmarking Machine Learning Algorithms](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1708.07747/) (2017)
- [MobileNets: Efficient Convolutional Neural Networks for Mobile Vision Applications](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1704.04861/) (2017)
- [Federated Optimization in Heterogeneous Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1812.06127/) (2018)
- [FMore: An Incentive Scheme of Multi-dimensional Auction for Federated Learning in MEC](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2002.09699/) (2020)
- [An Incentive Mechanism for Federated Learning in Wireless Cellular network: An Auction Approach](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2009.10269/) (2020)
- [Toward an Automated Auction Framework for Wireless Federated Learning Services Market](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1912.06370/) (2019)
- [A Comprehensive Survey of Incentive Mechanism for Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2106.15406/) (2021)
- [Utility-Maximizing Bidding Strategy for Data Consumers in Auction-based Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.06784/) (2023)
- [Pricing Fresh Data](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2006.16805/) (2020)

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Beyond Denial-of-Service: The Puppeteer's Attack for Fine-Grained Control in Ranking-Based Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2601.14687/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Auction-based Federated Learning (AFL) enables open collaboration among self-interested data consumers and data owners. Existing AFL approaches are commonly under the assumption of sellers' market in that the service clients as sellers are treated as scarce resources so that the aggregation servers as buyers need to compete the bids. Yet, as the technology progresses, an increasing number of qualified clients are now capable of performing federated learning tasks, leading to shift from sellers' market to a buyers' market. In this paper, we shift the angle by adapting the procurement auction framework, aiming to explain the pricing behavior under buyers' market. Our modeling starts with basic setting under complete information, then move further to the scenario where sellers' information are not fully observable. In order to select clients with high reliability and data quality, and to prevent from external attacks, we utilize a blockchain-based reputation mechanism. The experimental results validate the effectiveness of our approach.