# Nonbossy Mechanisms: Mechanism Design Robust to Secondary Goals

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.11967 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.11967/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 22 Jul 2023.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2411.13513/) (2024)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We study mechanism design when agents may have hidden secondary goals which will play a role when the primary utility of the outcomes is the same. We show that in such cases, a mechanism is immune to strategic manipulation if and only if it is incentive compatible with regard to primary utility -- a property we term "primary incentive compatibility" -- and nonbossy -- a well-studied property in the context of matching and allocation mechanisms. We give complete characterizations of primarily incentive-compatible and nonbossy mechanisms in various settings, including auctions with single-parameter agents and public decision settings where all agents share a common outcome. In particular, we show that in the single-item setting, a mechanism is primarily incentive compatible, individually rational, and nonbossy if and only if it is a sequential posted-price mechanism.