# Strengthening Consistency Results in Modal Logic

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.05053 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.05053/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 1 of its 20 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 11 Jul 2023.

## Builds on (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [When is an Example a Counterexample?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1310.6432/) (2013)

## Abstract (arXiv)

A fundamental question asked in modal logic is whether a given theory is consistent. But consistent with what? A typical way to address this question identifies a choice of background knowledge axioms (say, S4, D, etc.) and then shows the assumptions codified by the theory in question to be consistent with those background axioms. But determining the specific choice and division of background axioms is, at least sometimes, little more than tradition. This paper introduces **generic theories** for propositional modal logic to address consistency results in a more robust way. As building blocks for background knowledge, generic theories provide a standard for categorical determinations of consistency. We argue that the results and methods of this paper help to elucidate problems in epistemology and enjoy sufficient scope and power to have purchase on problems bearing on modalities in judgement, inference, and decision making.