# Efficient Communication for Pursuit-Evasion Games with Asymmetric Information

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.01305 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.01305/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 3 Jul 2023.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Strategic Communication under Threat: Learning Information Trade-offs in Pursuit-Evasion Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.07813/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We consider a class of pursuit-evasion differential games in which the evader has continuous access to the pursuer's location, but not vice-versa. There is an immobile sensor (e.g., a ground radar station) that can sense the evader's location and communicate that information intermittently to the pursuer. Transmitting the information from the sensor to the pursuer is costly and only a finite number of transmissions can happen throughout the entire game. The outcome of the game is determined by the control strategies of the players and the communication strategy between the sensor and the pursuer. We obtain the (Nash) equilibrium control strategies for both the players as well as the optimal communication strategy between the static sensor and the pursuer. We discuss a dilemma for the evader that emerges in this game. We also discuss the emergence of implicit communication where the absence of communication from the sensor can also convey some actionable information to the pursuer.